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Abstract—As our professional, social, and financial existences
become increasingly digitized and as our government, healthcare,
and military infrastructures rely more on computer technologies,
they present larger and more lucrative targets for malware.
Stealth malware in particular poses an increased threat because it
is specifically designed to evade detection mechanisms, spreading
dormant, in the wild for extended periods of time, gathering
sensitive information or positioning itself for a high-impact zero-
day attack. Policing the growing attack surface requires the
development of efficient anti-malware solutions with improved
generalization to detect novel types of malware and resolve these
occurrences with as little burden on human experts as possible.
In this paper, we survey malicious stealth technologies as
well as existing solutions for detecting and categorizing these
countermeasures autonomously. While machine learning offers
promising potential for increasingly autonomous solutions with
improved generalization to new malware types, both at the
network level and at the host level, our findings suggest that
several flawed assumptions inherent to most recognition algo-
rithms prevent a direct mapping between the stealth malware
recognition problem and a machine learning solution. The
most notable of these flawed assumptions is the closed world
assumption: that no sample belonging to a class outside of a static
training set will appear at query time. We present a formalized
adaptive open world framework for stealth malware recognition
and relate it mathematically to research from other machine
learning domains.
Index Terms—Stealth, Malware, Rootkits, Intrusion Detection,
Machine Learning, Open Set, Recognition, Anomaly Detection,
Outlier Detection, Extreme Value Theory, Novelty Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
MALWARES have canonically been lumped into cate-gories such as viruses, worms, Trojans, rootkits, etc.
Today’s advanced malwares, however, often include many
components with different functionalities. For example, the
same malware might behave as a virus when spreading over a
host, behave as a worm when propagating through a network,
exhibit botnet behavior when communicating with command
and control (C2) servers or synchronizing with other infected
machines, and exhibit rootkit behavior when concealing it-
self from an intrusion detection system (IDS). A thorough
study of all aspects of malware is important for developing
security products and computer forensics solutions, but stealth
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components pose particularly difficult challenges. The ease or
difficulty of repairative measures is irrelevant if the malware
can evade detection in the first place.
While some authors refer to all stealth malwares as rootkits,
the term rootkit properly refers to the modules that redi-
rect code execution and subvert expected operating system
functionalities for the purpose of maintaining stealth. With
respect to this usage of the term, rootkits deviate from other
stealth features such as elaborate code mutation engines that
aim to change the appearance of malicious code so as to
evade signature detection without changing the underlying
functionality.
As malwares continue to increase in quantity and sophis-
tication, solutions with improved generalization to previously
unseen malware samples/types that also offer sufficient diag-
nostic information to resolve threats with as little human bur-
den as possible are becoming increasingly desirable. Machine
learning offers tremendous potential to aid in stealth malware
intrusion recognition, but there are still serious disconnects
between many machine learning based intrusion detection
“solutions” presented by the research community and those
actually fielded in IDS software. Robin and Paxson [1] discuss
several factors that contribute to this disconnect and suggest
useful guidelines for applying machine learning in practical
IDS settings. Although their suggestions are a good start, we
contend that refinements must be made to machine learning
algorithms themselves in order to effectively apply such algo-
rithms to the recognition of stealth malware. Specifically, there
are several flawed assumptions inherent to many algorithms
that distort their mappings to realistic stealth malware intrusion
recognition problems. The chief among these is the closed-
world assumption – that only a fixed number of known
classes that are available in the training set will be present
at classification time.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present the first comprehensive academic survey of
stealth malware technologies and countermeasures. There
have been several light and narrowly-scoped academic
surveys on rootkits [2]–[4], and many broader surveys
on the problem of intrusion detection, e.g. [5]–[7], some
specifically discussing machine learning intrusion detec-
tion techniques [1], [8]–[10]. However, none of these
works come close to addressing the mechanics of stealth
malware and countermeasures with the level of technical
and mathematical detail that we provide. Our survey
is broader in scope and more rigorous in detail than
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any existing academic rootkit survey and provides not
only detailed discussion of the mechanics of stealth mal-
wares that goes far beyond rootkits, but an overview of
countermeasures, with rigorous mathematical detail and
examples for applied machine learning countermeasures.
• We analyze six flawed assumptions inherent to many
machine learning algorithms that hinder their application
to stealth malware intrusion recognition and other IDS
domains.
• We propose an adaptive open world mathematical frame-
work for stealth malware recognition that obviates
the six inappropriate assumptions. Mathematical proofs
of relationships to other intrusion recognition algo-
rithms/frameworks are included, and the formal treatment
of open world recognition is mathematically generalized
beyond previous work on the subject.
Throughout this work, we will mainly provide examples
for the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems, sup-
plementing where appropriate with examples from other OS
types. Our primary rationale for this decision is that, according
to numerous recent tech reports from anti-malware vendors
and research groups [11]–[19], malware for the Windows
family of operating systems is still far more prevalent than
for any other OS type (cf. Fig. 1). Our secondary rationale is
that within the academic literature that we examined, we found
comparatively little research discussing Windows security. We
believe that this gap needs to be filled. Note that many of the
stealth malware attacks and defenses that apply to Windows
have their respective analogs in other systems, but each system
has its unique strengths and susceptibilities. This can be seen
by comparing our survey to parts of [20], in which Faruki
et al. provide a survey of generic Android security issues
and defenses. Nonetheless, since our survey is about stealth
malware; not exclusively Windows stealth malware, we shall
occasionally highlight techniques specific to other systems and
mention discrepancies between systems. Unix/Linux rootkits
shall also be discussed because the development of Unix rootk-
its pre-dates the development of Windows. Any system call
will be marked in a special font, while proper nouns are
highlighted differently. A complete list of Windows system
calls discussed in this paper is given in Tab. I of the appendix.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
Sec. II we present the problems inherent to stealth malware
by providing a comprehensive survey of stealth malware
technologies, with an emphasis on rootkits and code obfus-
cation. In Sec. III, we discuss stealth malware countermea-
sures, which aim to protect the integrity of areas of systems
known to be vulnerable to attacks. These include network
intrusion recognition countermeasures as well as host intrusion
recognition countermeasures. Our discussion highlights the
need for these methods to be combined with more generic
recognition techniques. In Sec. IV, we discuss some of these
more generic stealth malware countermeasures in the research
literature, many of which are based on machine learning. In
Sec. V, we identify six critical flawed algorithmic assumptions
that hinder the utility of machine learning approaches for
malware recognition and more generic IDS domains. We
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Fig. 1: MALWARE PROPORTIONS AND RATES BY PLATFORM.
As shown in (a), malware designed specifically for the Microsoft
Windows family of operating systems accounts for over 90 % of all
malware. While malware for other platforms is growing rapidly, at
current growth rates, shown in (b), the quantity of malware designed
for any other platform is unlikely to surpass the quantity of Windows
malware any time soon. Examining overall growth rates per platform,
we see higher growth rates in non windows malware, but a high
growth rate on a small base is still quite small in terms of overall
impact. For Windows the 88% growth rate is on a base of 135
million malware samples, which translates into about 118 million
new Windows malwares. In comparison the high growth rate for
Apple iOS, with an increase of more than 230%, is on a base of
30,400 samples, with the total number of discovered Apple malware
samples in 2015 just under 70,000; very small compared to the
number of Windows malware samples as well as the 4.5 milion
Android malware samples. Numbers for these plots were obtained
from a 2016 HP Enterprise threat report [13].
then formalize an adaptive open world framework for stealth
malware recognition, bringing together recent advances in
several areas of machine learning literature including intrusion
detection, novelty detection, and other recognition domains.
Finally, Sec. VI concludes this survey.
II. A SURVEY OF EXISTING STEALTH MALWARE
We discuss four types of stealth technology: rootkits, code
mutation, anti-emulation, and targeting mechanisms. Before
getting into the details of each, we summarize them at a high
level. Note that current malware usually uses a mixture of
several or all concepts that are described in this section. For
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example, a rootkit might maintain malicious files on disk that
survive reboots, while using hooking techniques to hide these
files and processes so that they cannot be easily detected and
removed, and applying code mutation techniques to prevent
anti-malware systems from detecting running code.
Rootkit technology refers to software designed for two
purposes: maintaining stealth presence and allowing continued
access to a computer system. The stealth functionality includes
hiding files, hiding directories, hiding processes, masking
resource utilization, masking network connections, and hiding
registry keys. Not all rootkit technology is malicious, for
example, some anti-malware suites use their own rootkit
technologies to evade detection by malware. Samhain [21],
[22], for example, was one of the first pieces of anti-malware
(specifically anti-rootkit) software to hide its own presence
from the system, such that a malware or hacker would not be
able to detect and, thus, kill off the Samhain process. Whether
rootkit implementations are designed for malicious or benign
applications, many of the underlying technologies are the
same. In short, rootkits can be thought of as performing man-
in-the-middle attacks between different components of the
operating system. In doing so, different rootkit technologies
employ radically different techniques. In this section, we
review four different types of rootkits.
Unlike rootkit technologies, code mutation does not aim
to change the dynamic functionality of the code. Instead it
aims to alter the appearance of code with each generation,
generally at the binary level, so that copies of the code cannot
be recognized by simple pattern-matching algorithms.
Due in part to the difficulties of static code analysis, and
in part to protect system resources, the behavior of suspicious
executables is often analyzed by running these executables in
virtual sandboxed environments. Anti-emulation technologies
aim to detect these sandboxes; if a sandbox is detected, they
alter the execution flow of malicious code in order to stay
hidden.
Finally, targeting mechanisms seek to manage the spread
of malware and therefore minimize risk of detection and
collateral damage, allowing it to remain in the wild for a longer
period of time.
A. Type 1 Rootkits: Malicious System Files on Disk
Summary: Mimic system process files.
Advantages: Easy to install, survives reboots.
Disadvantages: Easy to detect and remove.
The first-generation of rootkits masqueraded as disk-resident
system programs (e.g., ls, top) on early Unix machines, pre-
dating the development of Windows. These early implemen-
tations were predominantly designed to obtain elevated privi-
leges, hence the name “rootkit”. Modern rootkit technologies
are designed to maintain stealth, perform activity logging (e.g.,
key logging), and set up backdoors and covert channels for
command and control (C2) server communication [3].
Although modern rootkits (types 2, 3, and 4) rely on privi-
lege escalation for their functionalities, their main objective is
stealth (although privilege escalation is often assumed) [23].
Since first-generation rootkits reside on disk, they are easily
detectable via a comparison of their hashes or checksums to
hashes or checksums of system files. Due to early file integrity
checkers such as Tripwire [24], first-generation rootkits have
greatly decreased in prevalence and modern rootkits have
trended toward memory residency over disk residency [25],
[26]. This should not be conflated with saying that modern
malwares are trending away from disk presence – e.g. Gapz
[27] and Olmasco [28] are advanced bootkits with persistent
disk data. As we shall see below, many modern rootkits are
specifically designed to intercept calls that enumerate files
associated with a specific malware and hide these files from
the file listing.
B. Type 2 Rootkits: Hooking and in-Memory Redirection of
Code Execution
Summary: Code injection by modifying pointers to li-
braries/functions or by explicit insertion of code.
Advantages: Difficult to differentiate genuine and mali-
cious hooking.
Disadvantages: Difficult to inject.
Second-generation rootkits hijack process memory and di-
vert the flow of code execution so that malicious code gets
executed. This rootkit technique is generally referred to as
hooking, and can be done in several ways [23]; e.g., via mod-
ification of function pointers to point to malicious code or via
inline function patching – an approach involving overwriting
of code; not just pointers [29]. For readability, however, we
use the term hooking to refer to any in-memory redirection of
code execution.
Rootkits use hooking to alter memory so that malicious
code gets executed, usually prior to or after the execution
of a legitimate operating system call [26], [29]. This allows
the rootkit to filter return values or functionality requested
from the operating system. There are three types of hooking
[25]: user-mode hooking, kernel-mode hooking, and hybrid
hooking.
Hooking in general is not an inherently malicious technique.
Legitimate uses for hooking exist, including hot patching,
monitoring, profiling, and debugging. Hooking is generally
straightforward to detect, but distinguishing legitimate hooking
instances from (malicious) rootkit hooking is a challenging
task [25], [26].
1) User-Mode Hooking:
Summary: Injection of code into User DLLs.
Advantages: Difficult to classify as malicious.
Disadvantages: Easy to detect.
To improve resource utilization and to provide an organized
interface to request kernel resources from user space, much
of the Win32 API is implemented as dynamically linked
libraries (DLLs) whose callable functions are accessible via
tables of function pointers. DLLs allow multiple programs
to share the same code in memory without requiring the
code to be resident in each program’s binary [30]. In and
of themselves, DLLs are nothing more than special types
of portable executable (PE) files. Each DLL contains an
Export Address Table (EAT) of pointers to functions
that can be called outside of the DLL. Other programs
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(a) Normal Operation
(b) Infected Operation
Fig. 2: HOOKING. This figure shows an example of code redirection on shared library imports. (a) displays the normal operation of API
calls, where API pointers of the DLL’s EAT are copied into the executable’s IAT. (b) shows how IAT hooking injects (malicious) code from
a user DLL before executing the original API call 1.
that wish to call these exported functions generally have an
Import Address Table (IAT) containing pointers to the
DLL functions in their PE images in memory. This lays the
ground for the popular user-mode rootkit exploit known as
IAT hooking [3], in which the rootkit changes the function
pointers within the IAT to point to malicious code. Fig. 2
illustrates both malicious and legitimate usage of IAT hooks.
In the context of rootkit IAT hooking, the functions hooked
are almost always operating system API functions and the
malicious code pointed to by the overwritten IAT entry, in
addition to its malicious behavior, almost always makes a call
to the original API function in order to spoof its functionality
[3], [25]. Prior to or after the original API call, however,
the malicious code causes the result of the library call to be
changed or filtered. By interposing the FindFirstFile and
FindNextFile Win32 API calls, for example, a rootkit can
selectively filter files of specific unicode identifiers so that
they will not be seen by the caller. This particular exploit
might involve calling FindNextFile multiple times within
the malicious code to skip over malicious files and protect its
stealth.
IAT hooking is nontrivial and has its limitations [25], [30],
[31], for example, it requires the PE header of the target binary
to be parsed and the correct addresses of target functions to
be identified. Practically, IAT hooking is restricted to OS API
calls, unless specifically engineered for a particular non-API
DLL [25], [31]. An additional difficulty of IAT hooking is
that DLLs can be loaded at different times with respect to the
executable launch [25]. DLLs can be loaded either at load time
or at runtime of the executable. In the latter case, the IAT does
not contain function pointers until just before they are used,
so hooking the IAT is considerably more difficult. Further, by
loading DLLs with the Win32 API calls LoadLibrary and
GetProcAddress, no entries will be created in the IAT,
making the loaded DLLs impervious to IAT hooking [25],
[30].
Inline function patching, a.k.a. detouring, is another com-
mon second-generation technique, which avoids some of the
shortcomings of IAT hooking [25]. Unlike function pointer
modification, detouring uses the direct modification of code
in memory. It involves overwriting a snippet of code with an
unconditional jump to malicious code, saving the stub of code
that was overwritten by the malicious code, executing the stub
after the malicious code, and possibly jumping back to the
point of departure from the original code so that the original
code gets executed – a technique known as trampolining [25].
In practice, overwriting generic code segments is difficult
for several reasons. First, stub-saving without corrupting mem-
ory is inherently difficult [26]. Second, the most common
instruction sets, including x86 and x86-64, are variable-length
instruction sets, meaning that disassembly is necessary to
avoid splitting instructions in a generic solution [32]. Not
only is disassembly a high overhead task for stealth software,
but even with an effective disassembly strategy, performing
arbitrary jumps to malicious code can result in unexpected
behavior that can compromise the stealth of the rootkit [26].
Consider, for example, mistakenly placing a jump to shell code
and back into a loop that executes for many iterations. One
execution of the shell code might have negligible overhead,
but a detour placed within an otherwise tight loop may have
a noticeable effect on system behavior.
Almost all existing Windows rootkits that rely on inline
function patching consequently hook in the first few bytes of
the target function [25]. In addition to the fact that an imme-
diate detour limits the potential for causing strange behaviors,
many Windows compilers for x86 leave 5 NOP bytes at the
beginning of each function. These bytes can easily be replaced
by a single byte jump opcode and a 32 bit address. This is not
an oversight. Rather, like hooking in general, detours are not
inherently malicious and have a legitimate application, namely
hot patching [33]. Hot patching is a technique, which uses
detours to perform updates to binary in memory. During hot
patching, an updated copy of the function is placed elsewhere
in memory and a jump instruction with the address of the
updated copy as an argument is placed at the beginning
of the original function. The purpose of hot patching is to
increase availability without the need for program suspension
or reboot [34]. Microsoft Research even produced a software
package called Detours specifically designed for hot patching
[33], [34]. In addition, detours are also used in anti-malware
[25]. Like IAT hooks, detours are relatively easy to detect.
However, the legitimate applications of detours are difficult to
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distinguish from rootkit uses of detours [25], [34].
Detours are also not limited in scope to user mode API
functions. They can also be used to hook kernel functions
[25]. Regardless of the hooking strategy, when working in
user mode, a rootkit must place malicious code into the address
space of the target process. This is usually orchestrated through
DLL injection, i.e., by making a target process load a DLL into
its address space. Having a process load a DLL is common,
so common that DLL injection can simply be performed using
Win32 API functionality. This makes DLL injections easy
to detect. However, discerning benign DLL injections from
malicious DLL injections is a more daunting task [35]–[37].
Three of the most common DLL injection techniques are
detailed in [35]–[37]. The simplest technique exploits the
AppInit_DLLs registry key, which proceeds as follows: a
DLL, containing a DllMain function is written, optionally
with a payload to be executed. The DLL main function takes
three arguments: a DLL handle, the reason for the call (process
attach/detach or thread attach/detach), and a third value which
depends on whether the DLL is statically or dynamically
loaded. By changing the value of the AppInit_DLLs registry
key to include the path to the DLL to be executed, and
changing the LoadAppInit_DLLs registry key’s value to
1, whenever any process loads user32.dll, the injected
DLL will also be loaded and the DllMain functionality will
be executed. Although the DLL gets injected only when a
program loads user32.dll, user32.dll is prevalent in
many applications, since it is responsible for key user interface
functionality. Whether or not DllMain calls malicious func-
tionality, the AppInit technique can be used to inject a DLL
into an arbitrary process’ address space, as long as that process
calls functionality from user32.dll. Note that, although
the injection itself involves setting a registry key, which could
indicate the presence of a rootkit, the rootkit can change the
value of the registry key once resident in the target process’
address space [25].
A second method of DLL injection exploits Windows event
hook chains [36], [38], [39]. Event hook chains are linked lists
containing function pointers to application-defined callbacks.
Different hook chains exist for different types of events,
including key presses, mouse motions, mouse clicks, and mes-
sages [39]. Additional procedures can be inserted into hook
chains using the SetWindowsHookEx Win32 API call. By
default, inserted hook procedures are placed at the front of
a hook chain, e.g., prominent rootkits/bootkits [28], [40]
overwrite the pointer to the handlers in the DRIVER_OBJECT
structure, but some rootkits, e.g., Win32/Gapz [27], use
splicing, patching the handlers’ code themselves. Upon an
event associated with a particular hook chain, the operating
system sequentially calls functions within the hook chain. Each
hook function determines whether it is designed to handle the
event. If not, it calls the CallNextHookEx API function.
This invokes the next procedure within the hook chain. There
are two specific types of hook chains: global and thread
specific. Global hooks monitor events for all threads within
the calling thread’s desktop, whereas thread-specific hooks
monitor events for individual threads. Global hook procedures
must reside in a DLL disjoint from the calling thread’s code,
whereas local hook procedures may reside within the code of
the calling thread or within a DLL [39].
For hook chain DLL injection a support program is required,
as well as a DLL exporting the functionality to be hooked.
The attack proceeds as follows [36]: the support program
gets a handle to the DLL and obtains the address of one
of the exported functions through Win32 API calls. The
support program then calls the SetWindowsHookEx API
function passing it the action to be hooked and the address of
the exported function from the DLL. SetWindowsHookEx
places the hook routine into the hook chain of the victim
process, so that the DLL functionality is invoked whenever
a specified event is triggered. When the event first occurs,
the OS injects the specified DLL into the process’ address
space, which automatically causes the DllMain function to
be called. Subsequent events do not require the DLL to be
reloaded since the DLL’s exports get called from within the
victim process’ address space. An example keylogger rootkit
is shown in Fig. 3, which will log the pressed key and call
CallNextHookEx to trigger the default handling of the
keystroke. Again, benign addition of hook chain functions
via SetWindowsHookEx is common, e.g., to decide which
window/process should get the keystroke; the difficult task is
determining if any of the added functions are malicious.
A third common DLL injection strategy involves creating a
remote thread inside the virtual address space of a target pro-
cess using the CreateRemoteThread Win32 API call [37].
The injection proceeds as follows [37]: a support program con-
trolled by the malware calls OpenProcess, which returns a
handle to the target process. The support program then calls
GetProcAddress for the API function LoadLibrary.
LoadLibrary will be accessible from the target process
because this API function is part of kernel32.dll, a
user space DLL from which every Win32 user space pro-
cess imports functionality. To insert the exported function
name into the target process’ address space, the malicious
process must call the VirtualAllocEx API function. This
API function allocates a virtual memory range within the
target process’ address space. The allocation is required in
order to store the name of the rootkit DLL function. The
WriteProcessMemory API call is then used to place the
name of the malicious DLL into the target process’ address
space. Finally, the CreateRemoteThread API function
calls the LoadLibrary function to inject the rootkit DLL.
Like event chains, the CreateRemoteThread API call has
legitimate uses. For example, a debugger might fire off a
remote thread in a target process’ address space for profiling
and state inspection. An anti-malware module might perform
similar behavior. Finally, IO might be handled through pointers
to callbacks exchanged by several processes, where the call-
back method is intended to execute in another process’ address
space. The fact that the API call has so many potentially
legitimate uses makes malicious exploits particularly difficult
to detect.
2) Kernel-Mode Hooking:
Summary: Injection of code into the Kernel via device
drivers.
Advantages: Difficult to detect by user-mode IDSs.
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Keystroke
Function	1
Function	1		Callback
Windows	Hook	Setting		.	.	.HINSTANCE	hInstance	=	GetModuleHandle(NULL);SetWindowsHookEx(										 					WH_KEYBOARD_LL,										 					KeyLogger,										 					hInstance,	0);		.	.	.	
Function	2
Function	2		Callback
Function	0
KeyLogger
Fig. 3: EXPLOITING EVENT HOOK CHAINS. A prototypical keylogger application gets the target process’ context, injects a malicious
DLL into its address space, and prepends a function pointer to code within this DLL to the keypress event hook chain. Whenever a key is
pressed, the newly introduced callback is triggered, thereby allowing the malicious code to log every keystroke.
Disadvantages: Intricate to implement correctly.
Rootkits implementing kernel hooks are more difficult to
detect than those implementing user space hooks. In addition
to the extended functionality afforded to the rootkit, user space
anti-malwares cannot detect kernel hooks because they do not
have the requisite permissions to access kernel memory [25],
[26]. Kernel memory resides in the top part of a process’
address space. For 32-bit Windows, this usually corresponds
to addresses above 0x80000000, but can correspond to ad-
dresses above 0xC0000000, if processes are configured for
3GB rather than 2GB of user space memory allocation. All
kernel memory across all processes maps to the same physical
location, and without special permissions, processes cannot
directly access this memory.
Kernel hooks are most commonly implemented as de-
vice drivers [25]. Popular places to hook into the ker-
nel include the System Service Descriptor Table
(SSDT), the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT),
and I/O Request Packet (IRP) function tables of device
drivers [25]. The SSDT was the hooking mechanism used
in the classic Sony DRM Rootkit [41] and the more recent
Necurs malware [42], and is often a used as part of more
complex multi-exploitation kits such as the RTF zero-day
(CVE-2014-1761) attack [43] which was detected in the wild.
The SSDT is a Windows kernel memory data structure
of function pointers to system calls. Upon a system call,
the operating system indexes into the table by the function
call ID number, left-shifted 2 bits to find the appropriate
function in memory. The System Service Parameter
Table (SSPT) stores the number of bytes that arguments
require for each system call. Since SSPT entries are one
byte each, system calls can take up to 255 arguments. The
KeServiceDescriptorTable contains pointers to both
the SSDT and the SSPT.
When a user space program performs a system call, it
invokes functionality within ntdll.dll, which is the main
interface library between user space and kernel space. The
EAX register is filled with the system function call ID and
the EDX register is filled with the memory address of the
arguments. After performing a range check, the value of EAX
is used by the OS to index into the SSDT. The program counter
register IP is then filled with the appropriate address from the
SSDT, executing the dispatcher call. Dispatches are triggered
by the SYSENTER processor instruction or the more dated
INT 2E interrupt.
SSDT hooks are particularly dangerous because
they can supplement any system call with their own
functionality. Hoglund and Butler [25] provide an
example of process hiding via SSDT hook, in which
the NTQuerySystemInformation NTOS system
call is hooked to point to shell code, which filters
ZwQuerySystemInformation structures corresponding
to processes by their unicode string identifiers. Selective
processes can be hidden by changing pointers in this
data structure. Windows provides some protection to
prevent SSDT hooks by making SSDT memory read-only.
Although this protection makes the attacker’s job more
difficult, there are ways around it. One method is to
change the memory descriptor list (MDL) [25], [44] for
the requisite area in memory. This involves casting the
KeServiceDescriptorTable to the appropriate data
structure, and using it to build an MDL from non-paged
memory. By locking the memory pages and changing the
flags on the MDL one can change the permissions on memory
pages. Another method of disabling memory protections is
by zeroing the write protection bit in control register CR0.
The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is an-
other popular hook target [45]. The interrupt table contains
pointers to callbacks that occur upon an interrupt. Interrupts
can be triggered by both hardware and software. Because
interrupts have no return values, IDT hooks are limited
in functionality to denying interrupt requests. They cannot
perform data filtration. Multiprocessing systems have made
IDT hooking more difficult [25]. Since each CPU has its own
IDT, an attacker must usually hook IDTs of all CPUs to
be successful. Hooking only one of multiple IDTs causes an
attack to have only limited impact.
A final popular kernel hook target discussed by Hoglund
and Butler [25] is the IRP dispatch table of a device driver.
Since many devices access kernel memory directly, Windows
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abstracts devices as device objects. Device objects may rep-
resent either physical hardware devices such as buses or they
may represent software “devices” such as network protocol
stacks or updates to the Windows kernel. Device objects
may even correspond to anti-virus components that monitor
the kernel. Each device object has at least one device driver.
Communication between kernel and device driver is performed
via the I/O manager. The I/O manager calls the driver, passing
pointers to the device object and the I/O request. The I/O
request is passed in a standardized data structure called an
I/O Request Packet (IRP). Within the device object is
a pointer to the driver object. Drivers themselves are nothing
more than special types of DLLs. The I/O manager passes
the device object and the IRP to the driver. How the driver
behaves depends on the contents and flags of the IRP. The
function pointers for various IRP options are stored in a
dispatch table within the driver. A rootkit can subvert the
kernel by changing these function pointers to point to shell
code [25]. An anti-virus implemented as a filter driver, for
example, may be subverted by rewriting its dispatch table.
Hoglund and Butler [25] provide an in-depth example of
using driver function table hooking to hide TCP connections.
Essentially any kernel service that uses a device driver can
be subverted by hooking the IRP dispatch table in a similar
manner.
Note that while hooking device driver dispatch tables sounds
relatively simple, the technique requires sophistication to be
implemented correctly [25]. First, implementing bug-free ker-
nel driver code is an involved task to begin with. Since drivers
share the same memory address space as the kernel, a small
implementation error can corrupt kernel memory and result in
a kernel crash. This is one of the reasons that Microsoft has
gravitated to user-mode drivers when possible [46]. Second,
in many applications drivers are stacked. When dealing with
physical devices, the lowest level driver on the stack serves the
purpose of abstracting bus-specific behavior to an intermediate
interface for the upper level driver. Even in software, drivers
may be stacked, for example, anti-virus I/O filtering or file
system encryption/decryption can be performed by a filter
driver residing in the mid-level of the stack [25]. A successful
rootkit author must therefore understand how the device stack
behaves, where in the device stack to hook, and how to
perform I/O completion such that the hook does not result
in noticeably different behavior.
3) Hybrid Hooking:
Summary: Hook user functions into kernel DLLs.
Advantages: Even more difficult to detect than kernel
hooking.
Disadvantages: More difficult to implement than kernel
hooking.
Hybrid hooks aim to circumvent anti-malwares by attacking
user space and kernel space simultaneously. They involve
implementing a user space hook to kernel memory. Hoglund
and Butler [25] discuss a technique to hook the user space
IAT of a process from the kernel. The motivation behind
this technique is based on the observation that user space
IAT hooks are detectable because one needs to allocate
memory within the process’ context or inject a DLL for
the same effect. But is there some means to hook the IAT
through the kernel, without the need to allocate user space
memory for IAT hooks? The answer is yes: the attack in
[25] leverages two aspects of the Windows architecture. First,
it uses the PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine, a kernel
mode support routine that registers driver callback functions
to be called whenever a PE image gets loaded into memory
[47]. The callback is called within the target process’ context
after loading but before execution of the PE. By parsing the
PE image in memory, an attacker can change the IAT. The
question then becomes, how to run malicious code without
overt memory allocation or DLL injection into the process’
address space? One solution uses a specific page of memory
[48]: in Windows there exists a physical memory address
shared by both kernel space and user space, which the kernel
can write to, but the user cannot. The user and kernel mode
addresses are 0x7FFE0000 and 0xFFDF0000, respectively.
The reason for this virtual ↔ physical mapping convention
stems from the introduction of SYSENTER and SYSEXIT
processor instructions, for fast switches between user mode
and kernel mode. Approximately 1kB of this page is used by
the kernel [25], but the remaining 3kB are blank. Writing ma-
licious code to addresses in the page starting at 0xFFDF0000
in kernel space and placing a function pointer to the beginning
of the code at the corresponding address in user space allows
the rootkit to hook the IAT without allocating memory or
performing DLL injection.
Another hybrid attack is discussed in [49]. The attack
is called Illusion, and involves both kernel space and user
space components. The motivation behind the attack is to
circumvent intrusion detection systems that rely on system call
analysis (cf. Sec. III). To understand the Illusion attack, we
review steps involved in performing a system call: first, a user
space application issues an INT 3 interrupt or a SYSENTER
processor instruction, which causes the processor to switch
to kernel mode and execute the dispatcher. The dispatcher
indexes into the SSDT to find the handler for the system call
in question. The handler performs its functionality and returns
to the dispatcher. The dispatcher then passes return values to
the user space application and returns the processor to user
space. These steps should be familiar from the prior discussion
of hooking the SSDT. Illusion works by creating a one-
to-all mapping of potential execution paths between system
calls, which take array buffer arguments and the function
pointers of the SSDT. Although the same effect could be
obtained by making changes directly to the SSDT, the Illusion
approach, unlike SSDT hooking, cannot be detected using the
techniques discussed in Sec. III. Illusion exploits system calls
such as DeviceIoControl, which is used to exchange
data buffers between application and kernel driver. Parts of
the rootkit reside in both in kernel space and in user space.
Messages are passed between user space rootkit and kernel
space rootkit by filling the buffer. Communication is managed
via a dedicated protocol. This allows the user space rootkit
to make system calls on its behalf without changing the
SSDT. Further, metamorphic code as described in Sec. II-E
can be leveraged to change the communication protocol at
each execution.
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Fig. 4: DKOM ATTACK. This figure displays a successful DKOM
attack, where the malicious code of Process 2 is hidden from the
system yet continues to execute.
C. Type 3 Rootkits: Direct Kernel Object Manipulation
Summary: Modify dynamic kernel data structures.
Advantages: Extremely difficult to detect.
Disadvantages: Has limited applications.
Although second-generation rootkits remain ubiquitous,
they are not without their limitations. Their change of overt
function behavior inherently leaves a detectable footprint be-
cause it introduces malicious code – either in user space or
in kernel space – which can be detected and analyzed [23].
Third-generation direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM)
attacks take a different approach. DKOM aims to subvert
the integrity of the kernel by targeting dynamic kernel data
structures responsible for bookkeeping operations [23]. Like
kernel space hooks, DKOM attacks are immune to user space
anti-malware, which assumes a trusted kernel. DKOM attacks
are also much harder to detect than kernel hooks because they
target dynamic data structures whose values change during
normal runtime operation. By contrast, hooking static areas
of the kernel like the SSDT can be detected with relative
ease because these areas should remain constant during normal
operation [23].
The canonical example of DKOM is process hiding. The
attack can be carried out on most operating systems, and
relies on the fact that schedulers use different data structures
to track processes than the data structures used for resource
bookkeeping operations [50]. In the Windows NTOS kernel,
for example, the kernel layer1 is responsible for managing
thread scheduling, whereas the executive layer, which contains
the memory manager, the object manager, and the I/O manager
is responsible for resource management [46]. Since the execu-
tive layer allocates resources (e.g., memory) on a per-process
basis, it views processes as EPROCESS (executive process)
data structures, maintained in double circularly linked lists.
The scheduler, however, operates on a per-thread instance, and
consequently maintains threads in its own double circularly
linked list of KTHREAD (kernel thread) data structures. By
modifying pointers, a rootkit with control over kernel memory
can decouple an EPROCESS node from the linked list, re-
coupling the next and previous EPROCESS structures’ point-
ers. Consequently, the process will no longer be visible to the
1The kernel itself has three layers, one of which is called the kernel layer.
The other two layers of the kernel are the executive layer and the hardware
abstraction layer.
executive layer and calls by the Win32 API will, therefore,
not display the process. However, the thread scheduler will
continue CPU quantum allocation to the threads corresponding
to the hidden EPROCESS node. The process will, thus, be
effectively invisible to both user and kernel mode programs
– yet it will still continue to run. This attack is depicted in
Fig. 4.
While process hiding is the canonical DKOM example,
it is just one of several DKOM attack possibilities. Baliga
et al. [51] discuss several known DKOM attack variants,
including zeroing entropy pools for pseudorandom number
generator seeds, disabling pseudorandom number generators,
resource waste and intrinsic DOS, adding new binary formats,
disabling firewalls, and spoofing in-memory signature scans
by providing a false view of memory.
Proper DKOM implementations are extremely difficult to
detect. Fortunately, DKOM is not without its shortcomings and
difficulties from the rootkit developer’s perspective. Chang-
ing OS kernel data structures is no easy task and incorrect
implementations can easily result in kernel crashes, thereby
causing an overt indication of a malware’s presence. Also,
DKOM introduces no new code to the kernel apart from the
code to modify kernel data structures to begin with. Therefore,
inherent limitations on the scope of a DKOM attack are
imposed by the manner in which the kernel uses its data
structures. For example, one usually cannot hide disk resident
files via DKOM because most modern operating systems do
not have kernel level data structures corresponding to lists of
files.
D. Type 4 Rootkits: Cross Platform Rootkits and Rootkits in
Hardware
Summary: Attack systems using very low-level rootkits.
Advantages: Undetectable by conventional software
countermeasures.
Disadvantages: Requires custom low-level hypervisor,
BIOS, hardware or physical/supply chain compromise to
be effective.
Fourth-generation rootkit technologies operate at the virtu-
alization layer, in the BIOS, and in hardware [52]. To our
knowledge, fourth-generation rootkits have been developed
only in proof-of-concept settings, as we could not find any
documentation of fourth-generation rootkits in the wild. Be-
cause they reside at a lower level than the operating system,
they cannot be detected through the operating system and are,
therefore, OS independent. However, they still dependent on
the type of BIOS version, instruction set, and hardware [52].
Since fourth-generation rootkits are theoretical in nature – at
least as of now – we consider them outside the scope of this
survey. We mention them in this section for completeness and
because they may become relevant after the publication of this
survey.
E. Code Mutation
Summary: Self-modifying malicious code.
Advantages: Avoids simple signature matching.
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Old	Generationpop	edxmov	edi,	0004hmov	esi,	ebpmov	eax,	000Chadd	edx,	0088hmov	ebx,	[edx]mov	[esi+eax*4+00001118],	ebx
New	Generationpop	eaxmov	ebx,	0004hmov	edx,	ebpmov	edi,	000Chadd	eax,	0088hmov	esi,	[edx]mov	[edx+edi*4+00001118],	esi
RegSwap	virus
(a)
New	Generation
Old	Generation
0 1 2 3 4 5 86 7
01 234 5 86 7
(b)
Old	Generation		.	.	.inc	eaxmov	ebx,	immpop	eax		.	.	.	 New	Generation		.	.	.mov	ebx,	imminc	eaxpop	eax		.	.	.	
(c)
Old	Generation		.	.	.inc	eaxmov	ebx,	immpop	eax		.	.	.	
New	Generation		.	.	.inc	eaxnopmov	ebx,	immadd	eax,	0000hpop	eax		.	.	.	
(d)
Old	Generation		.	.	.inc	eaxmov	reg,	immpop	eax		.	.	.	 New	Generation		.	.	.add	eax,	0001hpush	imm;	pop	regpop	eax		.	.	.	
(e)
Fig. 5: METAMORPHIC CODE OBFUSCATION. Five techniques employed by metamorphic engines to evade signature scans across
malware generations. (a) Register swap: exchanging registers as demonstrated by code fragments from the RegSwap virus [53]. (b)
Subroutine permutation: reordering subroutines of the virus code. (c) Transposition: modifying the execution order of independent instructions.
(d) Semantic NOP-insertion: injecting NOPs or instructions that are semantically identical to NOPs. (e) Code mutation: replacing instructions
with semantically equivalent code.
Disadvantages: Greater runtime overhead and detectable
via emulation.
In early viruses, the viral code was often appended to the
end of an executable file, with the entry point changed to
jump to the viral code before running the original executable
[26]. Once executed, the virus code in turn would jump to the
beginning of the body of the executable so that the executable
was run post-replication. The user would be none the wiser
until the host system had been thoroughly infected. Anti-
malware companies soon got wise and started checking hashes
of code blocks – generally at the end of files. To counter,
malware authors began to encrypt the text of the viruses. This
required a decryption routine to be called at the beginning of
execution. The virus was then re-encrypted with a different
key upon each replication [26].
These encrypted viruses had a fatal flaw: the decryption
routine was jumped to somewhere in the executable. Anti-
malware solutions merely had to look for the decrypter. Thus,
polymorphic engines were created, in which the decryption
engine mutated itself at each generation, no longer matching
a fixed signature. However, polymorphic viruses were still
susceptible to detection [26]: although the detector mutated,
the size of the malicious code did not change, was still placed
at the end of the file, and was susceptible to entropy analysis,
depending on the encryption technique.
To this end, entry-point obscuring (EPO) viruses were
created, where the body of the viral code is placed arbitrarily
in the executable, sometimes in a distributed fashion [26].
To counter the threats from polymorphic viruses, Kaspersky
(of Kaspersky Lab fame) and others [54] created emulation
engines, which run potentially malicious code in a virtual
machine. In order to run, the body of the viral code must
decrypt itself in memory in some form or another, and when
it does, the body of the malicious code is laid bare for hashed
signature comparison as well as behavioral/heuristic analysis.
To combat emulation, metamorphic engines were developed.
Just as polymorphic malwares mutate their decryption engines
at each generation, metamorphic engines mutate the full body
of their code and, unlike polymorphics, change the size of the
code body from one generation to another [26]. Some mal-
wares still encrypt metamorphic code, or parts of metamorphic
code, while others do not – as encryption and run time packing
techniques can reveal the existence of malicious code [26].
Metamorphic code mutation techniques, as shown in Fig. 5,
include register swaps, subroutine permutations, transpositions
of independent instructions, insertion of NOPs or instruction
sequences that behave as NOPs, and parser-like mutations
by context-free grammars (or other grammar types) [54]–
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[57]. Many metamorphic techniques are similar to compilation
techniques, but for a much different purpose. The metamorphic
engine in the MetaPHOR worm, for example, disassembles
executable code into its own intermediate representation and
uses its own formal grammar to carry out this mutation [54].
Code transformation techniques are not particular to native
code either: Faruki et al. [58] presented several Dalvik byte-
code obfuscation techniques and tested them against several
Android security suites, which often failed at recognizing
transformed malicious code. While some of the transformation
targets are unique to obfuscation on Android devices – e.g.,
renaming packages and encrypting resource files – the control,
data, and layout transformations in [58] follow the same
principles of code obfuscation at the native level.
F. Anti-Emulation
Summary: Malware behaves differently when running in
an emulated environment.
Advantages: Malware evades detection during emulation.
Disadvantages: Needs to detect the presence of the
emulator reliably. May not run in certain virtualized
environments.
Mutation engines, including metamorphics and polymor-
phics, change the instructions in the target code itself and
naturally its runtime [53]. However, they do not change
the underlying functionality. Therefore, during emulation
(cf. Sec. III-E), behavioral and heuristic techniques can be
used to fingerprint malicious code, for example, if the malware
conducts a strange series of system calls, or if it attempts to
establish a connection with a C2 server at a known malicious
address. Hence, malware can be spotted regardless of the
degree of obfuscation present in the code [26].
The success of early emulation techniques led to the usage
of malicious anti-emulation tactics, which include attempts
to detect the emulator by examining machine configurations
– e.g., volume identifiers and network interface – and use
of difficult to emulate functionality, e.g., invoking the GPU
[26], [59]. In turn, emulation strategies have become more
advanced, for example, in their DroidAnalyst framework [59]
for Android, Faruki et al. implement a realistic emulation plat-
form by overloading default serial numbers, phone numbers,
geolocations, system time, email accounts, and multimedia
files to make their emulator more difficult to detect.
A realistic emulation environment is a good start to avoid
emulator detection based on hardware characteristics, but it
alone is insufficient to defeat all types of anti-emulation,
for example, Duqu only executes certain components after
10 minutes idle when certain requirements are met [60].
Similarly the Kelihos botnet [61], and the Nap Trojan [62]
use the SleepEx and NtDelayExecution API calls to
delay malicious execution until longer times than a typical
emulator will devote to analysis. PoisonIvy [63] and similarly
UpClicker [64] establish malicious connections only when
the left mouse button is released. PushDo takes a more
offensive approach, using PspCreateProcessNotify to
de-register sandbox monitoring routines [65]. Other malwares
take advantage of dialog boxes and scrolling [65]. Even mouse
movements are taken into consideration and malware can
differentiate between human and simulated mouse movements
by assessing speed, curvature, and other features [65]. Thus,
emulated environments for stealth malware detection face the
tradeoff between realistic emulation and implementation cost.
Anti-emulation in turn faces a different problem: with the
explosion of virtualization technology, thanks largely to the
heavy drive toward cloud computing, virtualized (emulated)
environments are seeing increased general-purpose use. This
draws into question the effectiveness of anti-emulation as a
stealth technique: if malicious code will not run in a virtual
environment, then it might not be an effective attack if the
targeted machine is virtualized.
G. Targeting Mechanisms
Summary: Malware runs on or spreads to only chosen
systems.
Advantages: Decreases risk of detection.
Disadvantages: Malware spreads at a lower rate. Motiva-
tion for the attack is given away if detected.
Stealth targeted attacks – which aim to compromise specific
targets – are becoming more advanced and more widespread
[66]. While targeting mechanisms are not necessarily designed
for stealth purposes, they have the effect of prolonging the
amount of time that malware can remain undetected in the
wild. This is done by allowing the malware to spread/execute
only on certain high-value systems, thus minimizing the likeli-
hood of detection while maximizing the impact of the attack.
For example, recent point of sale (POS) compromises [67]
targeted only specific corporations. The DarkHotel [68] ad-
vanced persistent threat (APT) targets only certain individuals
(e.g., business executives). The notorious Stuxnet worm and
its relatives Duqu, Flame, and Gauss employed sophisticated
targeting mechanisms [60], preventing the malwares from
executing on un-targeted systems. Stuxnet checks system
configuration prior to execution; malicious components simply
will not execute if the detected environment is not correct
rather attempting to execute and failing [69]. Gauss’s Gödel
module is even encrypted with an RC4 cipher, with a key
derived from system-specific data; thus, much of the function-
ality of the malware remains unknown, since a large part of
the body of the code can only be decrypted with knowledge of
the targeted machines [70]. Hence, IDS developers and anti-
malware researchers cannot get the malicious code running in
un-targeted machines. Targeting mechanisms may also change
the behavior of the malware depending on the configuration
of the machine so as to evade detection. For example, Flame
dynamically changes file extensions depending on the type
of anti-malware that it detects on the machine [71]. Other
malwares may simply not run or choose to uninstall themselves
to evade detection, while others will execute only under certain
conditions on time, date, and geolocation [26], [60].
III. COMPONENT-BASED STEALTH MALWARE
COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss anti-stealth malware techniques
that aim to protect the integrity of areas of systems, which are
PRE-PRINT OF MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATION SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 11
known to be vulnerable to attacks. These techniques include
hook detection, cross-view detection, invariant specification,
and hardware and virtualization solutions.
When assessing the effectiveness of any malware recogni-
tion system, it is important to consider the system’s respective
precision/recall tradeoff. Recall refers to the proportion of
malicious samples of a given type that were correctly detected
as malicious samples of that type, while precision refers to
the proportion of the samples that the system marked as
a malicious type that are actually of that malicious type.
Increased recall tends to decrease precision, whereas increased
precision tends to decrease recall. The “optimal” tradeoff
between precision and recall for a given system depends on
the application at hand. The integrity based solutions discussed
in this section tend to offer higher precision rates than the
pattern recognition techniques discussed in Sec. IV, but they
are difficult to update because custom changes to hardware
and software are required, making scalability an issue.
It is important to realize that the component protection
techniques presented in this section are in practice often
combined with more generic pattern recognition techniques
discussed in Sec. IV [1], [26], [65], for example, hardware
and virtualization solutions might be used to achieve a clean
view of memory, on which a signature scan can be run [22],
[72].
A. Detecting Hooks
Summary: Detect malwares that use hooking.
Advantages: Easy to implement.
Disadvantages: High false positive rates from legitimate
benign hooks.
If a stealth malware uses in-memory hooks as described
in Sec. II-B, IDSs can detect the malware by detecting its
hooks. Unfortunately, methods that simply detect hooks trigger
high false alarm rates since hooks are not inherently malicious.
This makes weeding out false positives a challenging task.
Also, since DKOM is not a form of hooking, hook detection
techniques cannot detect DKOM attacks.
Ironically, an effective approach to detect hooks is to hook
common attack points. By doing so, an anti-malware may not
only be able to detect a rootkit loading into memory, but may
also be able to preempt the attack. This might be accomplished
by hooking the API functions used to inject DLLs into a target
process’ context (cf. Sec. II-B1) [25]. However, one must
know what functions to hook and where to look for malicious
attacks. Pinpointing attack vectors is not easy. For example,
symbolic links are often not resolved to a common name until
system call hooks have been executed [25]. Therefore, if the
anti-malware relies on hooking the SSDT alone and matching
the name of the target in the hook routine, an attacker can
simply use an alias. Once hooks are observed, some tradeoff
between precision and recall must be made: One can easily
catch all rootkits loading into memory, and in doing so, create
a completely unusable system (i.e., very high recall rates but
extremely low precision rates).
Hook detection can be combined with signature and heuris-
tic scans (discussed in Sec. IV) for ingress point monitoring.
Based on a signature of the hooked code, the ingress point
monitoring system can determine whether or not to raise an
alarm. In contrast to trying to detect rootkit hooks as a rootkit
loads, VICE [25], [29] uses memory scanning techniques that
periodically inspect likely target locations of hooks such as
the IAT, SSDT, or IDT. VICE detects hooks based on the
presence of unconditional jumps to memory values outside of
acceptable address ranges. Acceptable ranges can be defined
by IAT module ranges, driver address ranges, and kernel pro-
cess address ranges. For example, a system call in the SSDT
should not point to an address outside ntoskrnl.exe.
Generic inline hooks cannot feasibly be detected via this
method. Fortunately, as we discussed in Sec. II-B, hooks
beyond the first few bytes of a function are rare, since they
can result in strange behaviors, including noticeable slow
down and outright program failure. For SSDT functions,
unconditional jumps within the first few bytes outside of
ntoskrnl.exe are indicators of hooks. IAT range checks
require context switching into the process in question, enu-
merating the address ranges of the loaded DLLs, checking
whether the function pointers in the IAT fall outside of their
corresponding ranges, and recursively repeating this for all
loaded DLLs.
A similar approach to VICE was taken in the implemen-
tation of System Virginity Verifier [73], which attempts to
separate malicious hooking from benign hooking by compar-
ing the in-memory code sections of drivers and DLLs to their
disk images. Since these sections are supposed to be read-
only, they should match in most cases, with the exception of
a few lines of self-modifying kernel code in the NTOS kernel
and hardware abstraction layers. Malicious hooks distinguish
themselves from benign hooks when they exhibit discrepancies
between in-memory and on-disk PE images, which will not
occur under benign hooking [73]. Additionally, if the disk
image is hidden then the hook likely corresponds to a rootkit.
One must be careful in this case to distinguish missing files,
which can occur in legitimate hooking applications, from
hidden files. Other examples of image discrepancies associated
with malicious hooks include failure of module attribution and
code obfuscation.
An indirect approach to detecting hooks was implemented
in Patchfinder 2 [74], in the form of API call tracing.
This approach counts the number of instructions executed
during an API call and compares the count to the number of
instructions executed in a clean state. The intuition is based on
the observation that in the context of rootkits, hooks almost
always add instructions [74]. The technique requires proper
baselining, which presents two challenges: first, deducing that
the system is in a non-hooked state to begin with is difficult
to establish, unless the system is fresh out of the box. Second,
the Win32 API has many functions, which take many different
arguments. Since enumerating all argument combination possi-
bilities while acquiring the baseline is infeasible, API calls can
vary substantially in instruction count even when unhooked.
B. Cross-View Detection and Specification Based Methods
Summary: Compare the output of API calls with that of
low-level calls that are designed to do the same thing.
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Advantages: Detects malware that hijacks API calls.
Disadvantages: Requires meticulous low-level code for
to replicate functionality of most of the system API.
Cross-view detection is a technique aimed to reveal the
presence of rootkits. The idea behind cross-view detection [75]
is to observe the same aspect of a system in multiple ways,
analogous to interviewing witnesses at a crime scene: just
as conflicting stories from multiple witnesses likely indicate
the presence of a liar, if different observations of a system
return different results, the presence of a rootkit is likely.
First, OS objects – processes, files, etc. – are enumerated via
system API calls. This count is compared to that obtained
using a different approach not reliant on the system API. For
example, when traversing the file system, if the results returned
by FindFirstFile and FindNextFile are inconsistent
with direct queries to the disk controller, then a rootkit that
hides files from the system is likely present.
One of the advantages of cross-view detection is that – if
implemented correctly – maliciously hooked API calls can
be detected with very few false positives because legitimate
applications of API hooking rarely change the outputs of the
API calls. Depending on the implementation, cross-view de-
tection may or may not assume an intact kernel, and therefore
may even be applied to detect DKOM. The main disadvantage
of cross-view detection is that it is difficult to implement,
especially for a commercial OS [76]. API calls are provided
for a reason: to simplify the interface to kernel and hardware
resources. Cross-view detection must circumvent the API, in
many cases providing its own implementation. Theoretically,
in most cases combinations of other API calls could be used
in place of a from-scratch implementation. However, API
call combinations are susceptible to the risk of other hooked
API calls or duplicate calls to the same underlying code for
multiple API functions, a common feature of the Win32 API
[46].
Several cross-view detection tools have been developed over
the years. Rootkitrevealer [77] by Windows SysInternals
applies a cross-view detection strategy for the purposes of
detecting persistent rootkits, i.e., disk-resident rootkits that sur-
vive across reboots. Rootkitrevealer uses the Windows API
to scan the file system and registry, and compares the results
to a manual parsing of the file system volume and registry
hive. Klister [74] detects hidden processes in Windows 2000
by finding contradictions between executive process entries
and kernel process entries used by the scheduler. Blacklight
[78] combines both hidden file detection and hidden process
detection. Microsoft’s Strider Ghostbuster [50] is similar to
Rootkitrevealer, except that it also detects hidden processes
and it has the ability to compare an “inside the box” infected
scan with an “outside the box” scan, in which the operating
system is booted from a clean version.
If properly applied, cross-view detection offers high pre-
cision rootkit detection [76]. However, cross-view detection
alone provides little insight on the type of the rootkit and
must be combined with recognition methods (e.g., signa-
ture/behavioral) to attain this information [26], [76]. Cross-
view detection methods are also cumbersome to update be-
cause they require new code, often interfacing with the kernel.
Determining, which areas to cross-view, is also a challenging
task [76].
C. Invariant Specification
Summary: Define constraints of an uninfected system.
Advantages: Detects DKOM attacks reliably.
Disadvantages: Constraints need to be well-specified,
often by hand, and are highly platform-dependent.
A related approach to cross-view detection, especially ap-
plied to detecting DKOM, involves pinpointing kernel invari-
ants – aspects of the kernel that should not change under
normal OS behavior – and periodically monitoring these
invariants. One example of a kernel invariant is that the length
of the executive and kernel process linked lists should be
equal, which is violated in the case of process hiding (cf.
Fig. 4). Petroni et al. [79] introduce a framework for writing
security specifications for dynamic kernel data structures.
Their framework consists of five components: a low-level
monitor used to access kernel memory, a model builder to
synthesize the raw kernel memory binary into objects defined
by the specification, a constraint verifier that checks the
objects constructed by the model builder against the security
specifications, response mechanisms that define the actions to
take upon violation of a constraint, and finally, a specification
compiler, which compiles specification constraints written in
a high-level language into a form readily understood by the
model builder.
Compelling arguments can be made in favor of the kernel-
invariant based security specification approaches described
above [79]: first, they allow a decoupling of site-specific
constraints from system-specific constraints. An organization
may have a security policy that forbids behavior not in direct
violation of proper kernel function (e.g., no shell processes
running with root UUID in Linux). Via a layered frame-
work, specifications can be added without changing low-level
implementations. Unlike signature-based approaches relying
on rootkits having overlapping code fragments with other
malwares, kernel-invariant specifications catch all DKOM
attacks that violate particular specification constraints with
only few false positives. The specification approach can even
be extended beyond DKOM. However, using kernel invariant
specification is not without its own difficulties. Proper and
correct framework implementation is a tremendous program-
ming effort in itself [79]. For closed-source operating systems
like Windows, full information about kernel data structures
and their implementation is seldom available, unless the spec-
ification framework tool is being developed as part of or in
cooperation with the operating system vendor. Specification
approaches can also exhibit false positives, for example, if
kernel memory is accessed asynchronously via an external PCI
interface like Copilot [22], a legitimate kernel update to a
data structure may trigger a false positive detection simply
because the update has not completed. Finally, the degree
to which the invariant-specification approach works depends
on the quality of the specification [79]. Correct specifications
require in-depth domain specific knowledge about the kernel
and/or about the organization’s security policy. Due to the
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massive sizes and heterogeneities of operating systems, even
those of similar distribution, discerning a complete list of
specifications is implausible without incorrect specifications
that result in false positives. While a similar approach may
have applications to other types of stealth malwares, Petroni
et al. [79] introduced invariant specification as specific solution
tailored to DKOM rootkits . Although invariant specification
provides more readily available diagnostic information than
cross-view detection because it tells which invariants are vio-
lated, invariant specification cannot discern the type of DKOM
rootkit. Hence, more generic signature/behavioral techniques
are required.
D. Hardware Solutions
Summary: Via hardware interface, use a clean machine
to monitor another machine for the presence of rootk-
its/stealth malware.
Advantages: Does not require an intact kernel on the
monitored machine.
Disadvantages: Cannot interpose execution of malicious
code.
The key motivation behind hardware based integrity check-
ing is quite simple: a well-designed rootkit that has success-
fully subverted the OS kernel, or theoretically even the virtual
layer and BIOS of a host machine, can return a spurious
view of memory to a host based intrusion detection system
(HIDS) such that the HIDS has no way of detecting the
attack because its correct operation requires an intact kernel.
Rather than relying on the kernel to provide a correct view of
kernel memory, hardware solutions have been developed. For
example, Copilot [22] uses direct memory access (DMA) via
the PCI bus to access kernel memory from the hardware of
the host machine itself and displays that view of memory to
another machine. This in turn subverts any rootkit’s ability to
change the view of memory, barring a rootkit implemented in
hardware itself. Depending on the hardware integrity checker
in question, further analysis of kernel memory on the host
machine may be performed via a supervisory machine alone,
or alternatively with the aid of additional hardware. Copilot
uses a coprocessor to perform fast hashes over static kernel
memory and reports violations to a supervisory machine. Anal-
ysis mechanisms similar to those in [49], [80] are employed
on the supervisory machine in conjunction with DMA in order
to properly parse kernel memory.
Using DMA to observe the memory layout of the host
system from a supervisory system is appealing since a correct
view of host memory is practically guaranteed. However, like
all of the techniques that we have discussed, hardware based
integrity checking is no silver bullet. In addition to the added
expense and annoyance of requiring a supervisory machine,
DMA based rootkit detection techniques can only detect
rootkits, but they cannot intervene in the hosts execution. They
have no access to the CPU and, therefore, cannot prevent
or respond to attacks directly. This CPU access limitation
not only means that CPU registers are invisible to DMA,
it also means that the contents of the CPU cache cannot
be inspected, leaving the theoretical possibility of a rootkit
hiding malicious code in the cache. However, a more pressing
concern is that because DMA approaches operate at a lower
level than the kernel they do not have a clear view of dynamic
kernel data structures, which requires that these structures
need to be located in memory, a problem discussed in [81].
Even after locating the kernel data structures, there remains
a synchronization issue between DMA operations and the
host kernel: DMA cannot be used to acquire kernel locks on
data structures. Consequently, race conditions result when the
kernel is updating a data structure contemporaneous with a
DMA read. False positives were observed by Baliga et al. [51]
for precisely this reason. An inelegant solution [22] is to
simply re-read memory locations containing suspicious values.
Another consideration when implementing DMA approaches
is the timing of DMA scans. Both [22] and [51] employed
synchronous DMA scans, which are theoretically susceptible
to timing attacks. Petroni et al. [22] suggested introducing
randomness to the scan interval timings to overcome this
susceptibility.
E. Virtualization Techniques
Summary: Use virtual environments to detect malware.
Advantages: Can be used to detect kernel-level rootkits
and interpose state.
Disadvantages: Vulnerable to anti-emulation.
Virtualization, though technologically quite different from
DMA, aims to satisfy the same goal of inspecting resources
of the host machine without relying on the integrity of the
operating system. Several techniques for rootkit detection,
mitigation, and profiling that leverage virtualization have
been developed, including [49], [72], [73], [82], [83]. The
idea behind virtualization approaches is to involve a virtual
machine monitor, a.k.a. the hypervisor, in the inspection of
system resources. Since the hypervisor resides at a higher
level of privilege than the guest OS, either on the hardware
itself or simulated in software, and the hypervisor controls the
access of the guest OS to hardware resources, the hypervisor
can be used to inspect these resources even if the guest
OS is entirely compromised. Unlike Copilot’s approach, in
which kernel writes and DMA reads are unsynchronized, the
hypervisor and the guest OS kernel are synchronous since the
guest OS relies on the hypervisor for resources. Moreover,
the hypervisor has access to state information in the CPU,
meaning that it can interpose state, a valuable ability not only
for rootkit detection, prevention and mitigation, but also for
computer forensics. Additionally, the hypervisor can be used
to enforce site specific hardware policies, for example the
hypervisor can prevent promiscuous mode network interface
operation [72]. Hypervisors themselves may be vulnerable to
attack, but the threat surface is much smaller than for an
operating system: hypervisors have been written in as little
as 30,000 lines of C code as opposed to the tens of millions
of lines of code in modern Windows and Linux distributions.
Significant security validations on hypervisors have also been
conducted by academia, private security firms, the open source
community, and intelligence organizations (e.g., CIA, NSA)
[72].
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Garfinkel and Rosenblum [72] created Livewire, a proof of
concept intrusion detection system residing at the hypervisor
layer. The authors refer to their approach as virtual machine
introspection since the design utilizes an OS interface to
translate raw hardware state into guest OS semantics and
inspect guest OS objects via a policy engine, which interfaces
with the view presented by the translation engine. The policy
engine effectively is the intrusion detection system, which
performs introspection on the virtual machine. The policy
engine can monitor the machine and can also take mitigation
steps such as pausing the state of the VM upon certain events
or denying access to hardware resources.
A particular advantage of virtualization is that it can be
leveraged to prevent rootkits from executing code in kernel
memory – a task that all kernel rootkits must perform to
load themselves into memory in the first place [82]. This
includes DKOM rootkits: although the changes to kernel
objects themselves cannot be detected as code changes to the
kernel, code must be introduced at some point to make these
changes. To this end, Seshadri et al. [82] formulated SecVisor.
In contrast to the software-centric approach of Livewire,
SecVisor leverages hardware support for virtualization of
the x86 instruction set architecture as well as AMD’s secure
virtual machine technologies. SecVisor intercepts code via
modifications to the CPU’s memory management unit (MMU)
and the I/O memory management unit (IOMMU), so that only
code conforming to a user supplied policy will be executable.
As such, kernel code violating the policy will not run on the
hardware. In fact, SecVisor’s modification to the IOMMU
even protects the kernel from malicious writes via a DMA
device. SecVisor works by allowing transfer of control to
kernel mode only at entry points designated in kernel data
structures, then performing comparisons to shadow copies of
entry point pointers. This approach is analogous to that used in
memory integrity checking modules of heavyweight dynamic
binary instrumentation (DBI) frameworks like Valgrind [84].
Unfortunately, SecVisor has several drawbacks. First, mod-
ern Linux and Windows distributions mix code and data
pages [83], while SecVisor’s approach – enforcing write
XOR execute (W ⊕ X) permissions for kernel code pages
through hardware virtualization – assumes that kernel code
and data are not mixed within memory pages. The approach
also fails for pages that contain self-modifying kernel code.
Second, SecVisor requires modifications to the kernel itself –
a difficult proposition for adoption on closed-source operating
systems like Windows.
Riley et al. [83] formulated NICKLE (No Instruction Creep-
ing into Kernel Level Executed), which, like SecVisor, lever-
ages virtualization to prevent execution of malicious code in
kernel memory. NICKLE approaches the problem via software
virtualization and overcomes some of the limitations of SecVi-
sor. NICKLE works by shadowing every byte of kernel code
in a separate shadow memory writable only by the hypervisor.
Because the hypervisor resides in a higher privilege domain
than the kernel, even the kernel cannot modify the shadowed
code. The shadowed code gets authenticated either during
bootstrapping, when the kernel is loaded into memory, or when
drivers are mounted or unmounted. Authentication consists of
cryptographic hash comparisons of code segments with known
good values taken by OS vendors or distribution maintainers.
When the operating system requires access to kernel-level
code an indirection mechanism in the hypervisor reroutes this
request to shadow values. To maintain transparency to the
guest OS, this guest memory address indirection is imple-
mented after the “virtual to physical” address translation in the
hypervisors MMU. When the guest VM attempts to execute
kernel code, a comparison is made to shadow memory. If the
code is the same, then the shadow memory copy is executed.
If the kernel memory and shadow memory code differ then
one of several responses can be taken including logging
and observing – an approach extended by Riley et al. [85]
for rootkit profiling – rewriting the malicious kernel code
with shadow values and continuing execution, or breaking
execution. NICKLE’s approach has two key advantages over
SecVisor: first, it does not assume homogeneous code and
data pages. Second, it does not require any modifications
to kernel code. These benefits, however, incur hits in speed
due to software virtualization and memory indirection costs
and require a two-fold increase in memory for kernel code
[83]. An additional complication arises from code relocation:
when driver code is relocated in kernel memory, cryptographic
hashes change. Riley et al. [83] handle this problem by
tracking and ignoring relocated segments. Also, the NICKLE
implementation in [83] does not support kernel page swapping,
which would need to ensure that swapped in pages had the
same cryptographic hash as when they were swapped out.
Finally, NICKLE is ineffective in protecting self-modifying
kernel code, a phenomenon present in both Linux and Win-
dows kernels.
Srivastava et al. [49] leverage virtualization in their imple-
mentation of Sherlock – a defense system against the Illusion
attack mentioned in Sec. II-B3. Sherlock uses the Xen
hypervisor to monitor system call execution paths. Specifically,
the guest OS is assumed to run on a virtual machine controlled
by the Xen hypervisor. Monitoring of memory is conducted by
the hypervisor itself with the aid of a separate security VM for
system call reconstruction, analysis, and notification of other
intrusion detections systems. Watchpoints are manually and
strategically placed in kernel memory off-line, and a Büchi
automaton [49] is constructed, which efficiently describes the
expected and unexpected behavior of every system call in
terms of watch points. Each watch point contains the VMCALL
instruction, so that when it is hit, it notifies the hypervisor.
Watch point identifiers are passed to the automaton as they
are executed. During normal execution, the automaton remains
in benign states and watch points are discarded. When a
malicious state is reached, the hypervisor logs watch points
and suspends the state of the guest VM. The function specific
parameters at each watch point corresponding to a malicious
state are then passed to the security VM for further analysis.
An important consideration of this implementation is where
to place watchpoints to balance effectiveness and efficiency.
Srivastava et al. [49] manually chose watch point locations
based on a reachability analysis of a kernel control flow
graph, but suggest that an autonomous approach [86] could
be implemented.
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IV. PATTERN-BASED STEALTH MALWARE
COUNTERMEASURES
Pattern-based approaches aim to achieve more generic
recognition of heterogeneous malwares. While these ap-
proaches offer potential for efficient updates and scalability
beyond most component protection techniques, their increased
generalization causes them to tend to exhibit higher recall
rates but lower precision rates. Pattern-based approaches can
be applied on static code fragments or on dynamic memory
snapshots or behavioral data (e.g., system/API calls, network
connections, CPU usage, etc.) and may be coupled with com-
ponent protection approaches [26], [59], [87]. Static analysis
has the advantage that it is fast [26], since the raw code is
inspected but not executed; there is no need for an emulated
environment. However, dynamic code mutation mechanisms
outlined in Sec. II-E, are often able to hide functionalities
from static code analyzers [87], and obfuscated code recog-
nition techniques discussed in Sec. IV-C often rely on an
emulated environment for decryption. Dynamic analysis tools
that leverage emulated environments (cf. Sec. II-F) are not
fooled so easily, since much of the underlying code, data,
and behavior of the malware is revealed. However, dynamic
analysis is potentially vulnerable to anti-emulation techniques
(cf. Sec. II-F). While dynamic analysis techniques generally
suffer lower false-positive rates than static analysis techniques
[87] dynamic techniques are far slower than static approaches
[26] due to the need for an emulated environment, and can
only be feasibly executed on a small number of code samples
for short amounts of time. Consequently, hybrid approaches
[59] are often employed, in which static methods are used to
select suspicious samples, which are then passed to a dynamic
analysis framework for further categorization.
A. Signature Analysis
Summary: Compare code signatures with database of ma-
licious signatures via exact-matching or machine-learnt
techniques.
Advantages: Detects known malwares reliably.
Disadvantages: Difficult to detect novel malware types.
Code-signature-based malware defenses are techniques that
compare malware signatures – fragments of code or hashes of
fragments of code – to databases of signatures associated with
known attacks. Although signatures cannot be directly used to
discover new exploits [76], they can do so indirectly due to
component overlap between malwares [88], [89]. Ironically,
shared stealth components have sometimes given away the
presence of malwares that would have otherwise gone unno-
ticed [26]. Moreover, some byte sequences of length n (n-
grams) specific to a common type of exploit are often present
even under metamorphism of the code. Machine learning
approaches to malware classification via n-gram and sequence
analysis have been widely studied and deployed as integral
components of anti-malware systems for more than ten years
[26], [80].
While most in-memory rootkit signature recognition strate-
gies behave much like on-disk signature strategies for detect-
ing and classifying malicious code by matching raw bytes
against samples from known malware, DKOM rootkit de-
tection requires a different approach. Since DKOM involves
changing existing data fields within OS data structures to
hide them from view of certain parts of the OS, DKOM
signature scanning techniques instead perform memory scans
using signatures designed to pinpoint hidden data structures
in kernel memory. Surprisingly, memory signature scans are
useful both in live and forensics contexts. Chow et al. [90]
demonstrated that structure data in kernel memory can survive
up to 14 days after de-allocation, provided that the machine
has not been rebooted. Schuster [91] formulated a series of
signature rules for detecting processes and threads in memory,
for the general purpose of computer forensics. Several spinoffs
of this approach have been implemented. Unfortunately, many
of these signature approaches can be subverted by rootkits that
change structure header information. Dolan-Gavitt et al. [81]
employed an approach to automatically obtain signatures for
kernel data structures based on values in the structures that, if
modified, cause the OS to crash. The approach includes data
structure profiling and fuzzing stages. In the profiling stage, a
clean version of the operating system is run, while a variety
of tasks are performed. Kernel data structure fields commonly
accessed by the OS are logged. The goal of the profiling stage
is to determine fields that the OS often accesses and weed out
fields that are not widely used for consideration as signatures.
The fuzzing stage consists of running the OS on a virtual
machine, pausing execution, and modifying the values in the
candidate structure. After resuming, candidate structure values
are added to the signature list if they cause the kernel to crash.
The approach in [81] is in many ways the complement of the
kernel invariant approach in [51]. Instead of traversing kernel
data structures and examining which invariants are violated,
Dolan-Gavitt et al. scan all of kernel memory for plausible data
structures. If certain byte offsets within the detected structures
do not contain signatures consistent with certain values, then
the detections cannot correspond to actual data structures used
by the kernel because otherwise they would crash the operating
system. A limitation of the approach in [81] is that it is
susceptible to attack by scattering copies or near copies of
data structures throughout kernel memory.
B. Behavioral/Heuristic Analysis
Summary: Derived from system behavior rather than code
fragments.
Advantages: Not affected by attempts to hide malicious
code.
Disadvantages: Cannot detect malware prior to execution.
On the host level, signatures are not the only heuristic used
for intrusion detection. System call sequences for intrusion
and anomaly detection [92]–[98] are an especially popular
alternative for rootkit analysis since hooked IAT or SSDT
entries often make repetitive patterns of system calls. Inter-
estingly, rootkits can also be detected by network intrusion
detection systems (NIDSs), because rootkits in the wild are
almost always small components of a larger malware. The
larger malware often performs some sort of network activity
such as C2 server communication and synchronization across
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infected machines, or infection propagation. This is even true
for some of the most sophisticated stealth malwares that
leverage rootkit technologies to hide network connections from
the host [60], while a rootkit cannot hide connections from a
network. Therefore, signature scans at the network level as
well as traffic flow analysis techniques can give away the
presence of the larger malware as well as the underlying
rootkit. Botnets with rootkits that effectively hide the behavior
of an individual host may be easier to detect when analyzing
macro, network-level traffic [99], [100]. NIDSs also have the
advantage that they provide isolation between the malware and
the intrusion detection system, reducing a malware’s capacity
to spoof or compromise the IDS. However, NIDSs have no
way of inspecting the state of a host or interposing a host’s
execution at the network level. A hybrid approach, which
extends the concept of cross-view detection is to compare
network connections from a host query with those detected at
the network level [101]. A discrepancy indicates the presence
of a rootkit.
C. Feature Space Models vs. State Space Models
Summary: Classify code sequences.
Advantages: Can detect similar malicious code patterns.
Disadvantages: Cannot detect unseen malicious code.
As discussed above, code signatures and application be-
haviors/heuristics can be used in a variety of ways to detect
and classify intrusions, and they operate across many levels
of the intrusion detection hierarchy. For example, encrypted
viruses are particularly robust against code signatures – until
they are decrypted – but during emulation, once the virus is
in memory, it might be particularly susceptible to signature
analysis. This analysis may range from a simple frequency
count of OPCODES to more sophisticated machine-learning
techniques.
Machine learning models can be divided into feature space
and state space models. Examples of both are shown in Fig. 6,
in which code fragments are classified as malicious or benign
based on their OPCODE n-grams. Feature space models aim to
treat signature/behavioral features as a spatial dimension and
parameterize a manifold within this high-dimensional feature
space for each class. Feature space models can be further
broken down into generative and discriminative models. Gen-
erative models aim to model the joint distribution P (x, y)
of target variable y and spatial dimension x, and perform
classification via the product rule of probability: P (y|x) =
P (x,y)
P (x) . Discriminative classifiers aim to model P (y|x) directly
[102]. By treating the frequencies of distinct n-gram hashes
as elements of a high-dimensional feature vector, for example,
the input feature space becomes the domain of these vectors.
Support vector machines (SVMs), which are discriminative
feature space classifiers, aim to separate classes by fracturing
the input feature space (or some transformation thereof) by a
hyperplane that maximizes soft class margins. An advantage
of feature space models is that in high dimensions, even if
only a few of the dimensions are relevant, different classes
of data tend to separate [102]. However, feature space models
do not explicitly account for probabilistic dependencies, and a
good feature space from a classification accuracy perspective
is not necessarily intuitive.
State space models are used to infer probabilities about
sequences. They leverage the fact that certain sequences of
instructions exist within malicious binary due to functional
overlap as well as general lack of creativity and laziness
of malware authors. State space models can also be applied
to functional sequences (e.g., sequences of system calls or
network communications). The intuition is that we can use
certain types of functional behaviors to describe classes of
malware in terms of what they do, for example, ransomwares
like CryptoLocker typically generate a key that they use to
encrypt files on disk and subsequently attempt to send that
key to a C2 server. After a certain amount of time, they
remove the local copy of the key and generate a ransom screen
demanding money for the key [103]. State space models for
intrusion recognition aim to recognize these sorts of malicious
sequences.
The most common type of state space models are based in
some form on the Markov assumption – that recent events will
be independent of events that happened in the far past. While
the Markov assumption is not always valid, it makes sequential
inference tractable and is often reasonable. For example, if
the last fifty assembly instructions were devoted to adding
elements from two arrays together and incrementing respective
pointers, with no other knowledge, it is a reasonable assump-
tion that the next few instructions will add array elements. On
the other hand, knowing that “hello world” was printed to the
screen a million instructions ago provides little information
about the probability of the next instruction. Hidden Markov
models (HMMs) are perhaps the most widely used type of
Markov models [102] and have been particularly useful in
code analysis including recognition of metamorphic viruses
[55], [104]–[111]. HMMs assume that latent variables, which
take on states, are linked in a Markov chain with conditional
dependencies on the previous states. The order of the HMM
corresponds to the number of previous states on which the
current state depends, for example, in an n-th order HMM the
current state depends only on the previous n states.
In HMMs, previous states are fused with current states via
a transition probability matrix A governing the Markov chain,
and an observation probability matrix B – the probability of
observing the data in a given state – as well as an initial
state vector pi. A, B, and pi can be estimated via expectation
maximization (EM) inference on observation sequences O,
which aims to find the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
of a sequence of observations, i.e., arg maxλ P (O|λ), where
λ = (A,B, pi). Although EM is guaranteed to converge to a
local likelihood maximum, it is not guaranteed to converge to
the global optimum. In the context of HMMs, this inference is
usually carried out via the Baum-Welch algorithm [102] (aka.
the Forward-Backward algorithm), which iterates between
forward and backward passes and an update step until the
likelihood of the observed sequence O is maximized with
respect to the model.
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(a) Binary OPCODE n-gram histogram classification
State transition matrix
State S1 S2 S3 . . .
S1 0.6 0.3 0.1 . . .
S2 0 0.7 0.2 . . .
S3 0 0 0.5 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Observation probabilities
OPCODE S1 S2 S3 . . .
mov ebx, imm 0.6 0.1 0.01 . . .
mov esi, epb 0.07 0.5 0.06 . . .
add edx, 0088h 0 0.04 0.81 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) OPCODE sequence analysis
Fig. 6: FEATURE SPACE VS. STATE SPACE OPCODE CLASSIFICATION. This diagram depicts (a) a schematic interpretation of a
linear classifier that separates benign and malicious OPCODE n-grams in feature space and (b) a sequential OPCODE analysis using a
hidden Markov model. The feature space model must explicitly treat histograms of n-grams as independent dimensions for varying values of
n in order to capture sequential relationships. This approach is only scalable to a few sequence lengths. HMMs, on the other hand, impose
a Markov assumption on a sequence of hidden variables which emit observations. State transition and observation probability matrices are
inferred via expectation maximization on training sequences. An HMM factor graph is shown on the bottom left.
The usage of HMMs for metamorphic virus detection has
been documented in [55], [104]–[111].2 These works assume a
predominantly decrypted virus body, i.e., little to no encryption
within the body to begin with, or that a previously encrypted
metamorphic has been decrypted inside an emulator. The num-
ber of hidden states and therewith the state transition matrix is
generally chosen to be small (2-3), while observation matrix
is larger, with rows consisting of conditional probabilities of
OPCODES for given states. For metamorphic detection, the
semantic meaning of the states themselves is unclear as is
the optimal number of hidden states – they only reflect some
latent structure within the code. This contrasts with other
applications of HMMs, for example, in handwriting sequence
recognition, the latent structure behind a noisy scrawl of an
“X” is the letter “X” itself; thus with proper training data
there should be 26 latent variables (for the English alphabet)
with transition probabilities corresponding to what one might
expect from an English dictionary, e.g., a “T”→ “H” transition
is much more likely than a “T” → “X” transition.
A common metamorphic virus recognition measure is the
thresholded negative log-likelihood probability per OPCODE
[55], [106], [109] obtained from a forward pass on an HMM,
i.e.:
− log(p(O1, .., ON , z1, .., zN ))
N
,
2HMMs are used for many sequential learning problems and have several
different notations. Here, we borrow notation from [55]
where O1, . . . , ON are OPCODEs in an N -length program
and z1, . . . , zN are the hidden variables. The per-opcode
normalization is required because different programs have
different lengths. Most of the HMMs used in these works are
first-order HMMs, in which the state space probability distri-
bution of hidden variable zn is conditioned only on the value of
zn−1 and the current observation. For a k−th order HMM, the
probability of zn is conditioned on zn−1 . . . zn−k. However,
the time complexity of HMMs increases exponentially with
their order. Although in their works [55], [104]–[111] the
authors claim that the number of hidden variables did not seem
to make a difference, they might if higher-order Markov chains
were used. As Lin and Stamp [107] discuss, one problem with
HMMs is that it ultimately measures similarity between code
sequences; if the inter-class to intra-class sequential variation
is large enough due to some exogenous factor such as very
similar non-viral code in train/test, then HMM readout may
be error-prone.
V. TOWARD ADAPTIVE MODELS FOR STEALTH MALWARE
RECOGNITION
A large portion of the malware detected by both compo-
nent protection and generic recognition techniques is previ-
ously observed malware with known signatures, deployed by
script kiddies – attackers with little technical expertise that
predominantly use pre-written scripts to propagate existing
attacks [112]. Systems with up-to-date security profiles are
not vulnerable to such attacks.
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Sophisticated stealth malwares, on the other hand, have
propagated undetected for long periods of time because they
do not match known signatures, do not attack protected system
components with previously seen patterns, and mask harmful
behaviors as benign. To reduce the amount of time that these
previously unseen stealth malwares spend propagating in the
wild, component protection and generic recognition techniques
alike must be able to quickly recognize and adapt to new
types of attacks. Typically, it is slower to adapt component
techniques than it is to adapt generic recognition techniques
because new hardware and software are required. However,
even more generic algorithmic techniques may take time to
update and this must be factored into the design of an intrusion
recognition system.
The choice of the algorithm for efficient updates is only one
of several considerations that must be addressed in an intrusion
recognition system. More elementary is how to autonomously
make a decision that additional training data is needed and that
the classifier needs to be updated in the first place. In short,
an intrusion recognition system must be adaptive in order
to efficiently mitigate the threat of stealth malware. It must
also be interpretable to yield actionable information to human
operators and incident response modules. Unfortunately, many
systems proposed in the literature are neither adaptive nor in-
terpretable. We have isolated six flawed modeling assumptions,
which we believe must be addressed at the algorithmic level.
We discuss these flawed assumptions in Sec. V-A, and propose
an algorithmic framework for attenuating them Sec. V-C.
A. Six Flawed Assumptions
1) Intrusions are Closed Set: Real intrusion recognition
tasks have unseen classes at classification time. Neither all
variations of malicious code nor all variations of benign
behaviors can be known apriori. However, the majority of the
intrusion recognition techniques cited in this paper implicitly
assume that all classes seen at classification time are also
present in the training set, evaluating recognition accuracy only
for a fixed closed set of classes.
Consequently, good performance on IDS benchmarks does
not necessarily translate into an effective classifier in a real
application. In real open set scenarios, a classifier that is
trained on M classes of interest, at classification time is
confronted with instances of classes that are sampled from
a distribution of nearly infinitely-many categories. Conven-
tional classifiers are designed to separate classes from one
another by dividing a hypothesis space into regions and
assigning labels respectively. Effective classifiers roughly seek
to approximate the Bayesian optimal classifier on the pos-
terior probability P (yi|x; C1, C2, . . . , CM ), i ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
where x is a feature vector, yi is a class label, and Ci is
a particular known class. However, in the presence of Ω
unknown classes Un the optimal posterior model would be-
come P (yi|x; C1, C2, . . . , CM , U1, . . . , UΩ). Unfortunately, our
ability to model this posterior distribution is limited because
U1, . . . , UΩ are unknown. Mining negatives during training
may help to define known but uninteresting classes (e.g.,
CM+1), but it is impossible to span all negative space, and the
costs of negative training become infeasible with increasing
numbers of feature dimensions. Consequently, a classifier
may label space belonging to Ci far beyond the support of
the training data for Ci. This fundamental machine learning
problem has been termed open space risk [113]. Worse yet,
if probability calibration is used, x may be ascribed to Ci
with high confidence as distance from the positive side of the
decision boundary increases. Therefore, the optimal closed set
classifier operating in an open set intrusion recognition regime
is not only wrong, it can be wrong while being very confident
that it is correct. An open set intrusion recognition system
needs to separate M known classes from one another, but
must also manage open space risk by labeling a decision as
“unknown” when far from known class data. Problems with the
closed set assumption as well as desirable open set behavior
are shown in Fig. 7.
The binary intrusion recognition task, i.e., intrusion detec-
tion appears to be a two-class closed set problem. However,
each label – intrusion or no intrusion – is respectively a meta-
label applied to a collection of many subclasses. While some
of the subclasses will naturally be known, others will not, and
the problem of open space risk still applies.
2) Anomalies Imply Class Labels: The incorrect assump-
tion that anomalies imply class labels is largely related to
the closed set assumption, and it is implicit to all binary
malicious/benign classification systems. Anomalies constitute
data points that deviate from statistical support of the model in
question. In the classification regime, anomalies are data points
that are far from the class to which they belong. In the open
set scenario, anomalies should be resolved by an operator,
protocol, or other recognition modalities. Effective anomaly
detection is necessary for open set intrusion recognition.
Without it, the implicit assumption of an overly closed set can
lead to undesirable classifications because it forces a decision
to be made without support of statistical evidence. The confla-
tion between anomaly and intrusion assumes that anomalous
behavior constitutes intrusive behavior and that intrusive be-
havior constitutes anomalous behavior. Often, neither of these
assumptions hold. Especially in large networks, previously
unseen benign behavior is common: new software installations
are routine, new users with different usage patterns come and
go, new servers and switches are added, thereby changing the
network topology, etc. Stealth malwares, on the other hand,
are specifically designed to exhibit normal behavior profiles
and are less likely to be registered as anomalies than many
previously unseen benign behaviors.
3) Static Models are Sufficient: In the anti-malware do-
main, the assumption of a static model, which is implicit to
the closed set modeling assumption, is particularly insufficient
because of the need to update new nominal behavior profiles
and malicious code signatures. The attacks that a system
sees will change over time. This problem is often referred
to as concept drift in the incremental learning literature [114].
Depending on the model, the time required for a full batch
retrain may not be feasible. A kth-order HMM with k >> 1,
for example, may perform quite well for some intrusion
recognition tasks, but at the same time may be expensive to
retrain in terms of both time and hardware and may require
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7: PROBLEMS WITH THE CLOSED WORLD ASSUMPTION. (a) Red, green, and blue points correspond to a training set of different
classes of malicious or benign samples in feature space. The intersecting lines depict a decision boundary learnt from training a linear
classifier on this data. (b) The classifier categorizes points from a novel class (gray) as a training class (blue) with high confidence since the
gray samples lie far on the blue side of the decision boundary and the classifier labels span infinitely in feature space. (c) An idealized open
world classifier bounds the amount of space ascribed to each class’ label by the support of the training data, labeling unlabeled (white)
space as “unknown”. With manually or automatically supplied labels, novel classes (gray) can be added to the classifier without retraining
on the vast majority of data.
enormous amounts of training data in order to generalize
well. There is a temporal risk associated with the amount
of time that it takes to update a classifier to recognize new
malicious samples. Therefore, even if that classifier exhibits
high accuracy, it may be vulnerable to temporal risk unless it
possesses an efficient update mechanism.
4) No Feature Space Transformation is Required: A key
reason why machine learning algorithms are not overwhelmed
by the curse of dimensionality is that, due to statistical
correlations, classes of data tend to lie on manifolds that are
highly non-linear, but effectively much smaller in dimension
than the input space. Obtaining a good manifold representation
via a feature transformation obtained from either hand-tuned
or machine-learnt optimization is often critical to effective and
discriminative classification. Many approaches in the intrusion
detection literature simply pass raw log data or aggregated
log data directly to a decision machine [115]–[121]. The
inputs often possess heterogeneous scale and nominal and
continuous-valued features with aggregations, which ignore
temporal scale and varying spatial bandwidths. We contend
that, like any other machine learning task, fine-grained dis-
criminative intrusion recognition requires a meaningful feature
space transformation, whether learnt explicitly by the classifier
or carried out as a pre-processing task. Feature spaces for
intrusion recognition have been explored [122]–[130]. While
this research is a good start, we believe that much additional
work is needed.
5) Model Interpretation is Optional: Effective feature space
transformations must be balanced with semantically mean-
ingful interpretation. Unfortunately, these two objectives are
sometimes conflicting. Neural networks, which have been suc-
cessfully applied to intrusion recognition tasks [115], [131]–
[136], are appealing because they provide the ability to adapt
a fixed set of basis functions to input data, thus optimizing the
feature space in which the readout layer operates. However,
these basis functions correspond to a composition of aggrega-
tions of non-linear projections/liftings onto a locally optimal
manifold prior to final readout, and neither the semantic
meaning of the space, nor the semantic meaning of the final
readout is well understood. Recent work has demonstrated that
neural networks can be vulnerable to adversarial examples
[137]–[139], which are misclassified with high confidence,
yet appear very similar to known class data. The lack of
interpretability of such models means that not only could
intrusion recognition systems be vulnerable to such adversarial
models, but more critically, machine learning techniques are
not yet “smart” enough to resolve most potential intrusions.
Instead, their role is to alert specialized anti-malware modules
and human operators to take swift action. Fast response and
resolution times are critical. Even if an intrusion detection
system offers nearly perfect detection performance, if it cannot
provide meaningful diagnostics to the operator, a temporal
risk is induced, in which the operator or anti-malware wastes
valuable time trying to diagnose the problem [1]. Also, as
we have seen from previous sections, many potential malware
signals (e.g., hooking) may stem from legitimate uses. It is
important to know why an alarm was triggered and which
features triggered it to determine and refine the system’s
response to both malicious and benign behaviors.
The interpretation and temporal risk problems are not
unique to intrusion detection. They are a key reason why many
diagnosis and troubleshooting systems rely on directed acyclic
probabilistic graphical models such as Bayesian networks as
well as rule mining instead of neural networks or support
vector machines (SVMs) [140]. To better resolve the model
interpretation problem, intrusion detection should move to a
more generic recognition framework, ideally providing addi-
tional diagnostic information.
6) Class Distributions are Gaussian: The majority of prob-
abilistic models cited in this paper assume that class distribu-
tions are single or multi-modal Gaussian mixtures in feature
space. Although Gaussian mixtures often appear to capture
class distributions, barring special cases, they generally fail to
capture distribution tails [141].
There are several different types of anomalies. Empirical
anomalies are anomalous with respect to a probabilistic model
of training data, whereas idealized anomalies are anomalous
with respect to the joint distribution of training data. Provided
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good modeling, these two anomaly types are equivalent. How-
ever, from an anomaly detection perspective, naïve Gaussian
assumptions do not provide a good match between empirical
and idealized anomalies because an anomaly is defined with
respect to the tail of a joint distribution and tails tend to deviate
from Gaussian [141]. Theorems from statistical extreme value
theory (EVT) provide theoretically grounded functional forms
for the classes of distributions that these class-tails can assume,
provided that positive class outliers are process anomalies
– rare occurrences from an underlying generating stochastic
process – and not noise exogenous to the process, e.g.,
previously unseen classes.
B. An Open Set Recognition Framework
Accommodating new attack profiles and normative behavior
models requires a method for diagnosing when query data
are unsupported by previously seen training samples. This
diagnosis is commonly referred to as novelty detection in the
literature [142]. Specifically in IDS literature, novelty detec-
tion is often hailed as a means of detecting malicious samples
with no prior knowledge. The intuition is that by spanning the
space of normal behavior during training, any novel behavior
will be either an attack or a serious system error. In practice
however, it is infeasible to span the space of benign behavior.
Even on an individual host, “normal” benign behavior can
change dramatically depending on configurations, software
installations, and user turnover. The network situation is even
more complicated. Even for a medium size network, services,
protocols, switches, routers, and topologies vary routinely.
We contend that novelty detection has a particularly useful
role in the recognition of stealth malware, but the premise
that we can span the entire benign input space apriori is as
unrealistic as the premise that signatures of all known attacks
solve the intrusion detection problem. Instead, novelty detec-
tion should be treated in terms of what it does mathematically
– as a tool to recognize samples that are unsupported by the
training data and to quantify the degree of confidence to as-
cribe a model’s decision. Specifically, we propose treating the
intrusion recognition task as an open set recognition problem,
performing discriminative multi-class recognition under the
assumption of unknown classes at classification time. Scheirer
et al. [113], [143] formalized the open set recognition problem
as tradeoff between minimizing empirical risk and open space
risk – the risk of labeling unknown space – or mathematically,
the ratio of positively labeled space that should have been
labeled “unknown” to the total extent of positively labeled
space. A classifier that can arbitrarily control this ratio via an
adjustable threshold is said to manage open space risk.
Scheirer et al. [113] extended the linear SVM objective
to bound data points belonging to each known class by two
parallel hyperplanes; one corresponding to a discriminative
decision boundary, managing empirical risk, and the other
limiting the extent of the classification, managing open space
risk. Unfortunately, this “slab” model is not easily extensible
to a non-linear classifier. In later work [143], [144], they
extended their solution to multi-class open set recognition
problems using non-linear kernels, via posterior EVT cali-
bration and thresholding of nonlinear SVM decision scores.
EVT-calibrated one-class SVMs are used in conjunction with
multi-class SVMs to simultaneously bound open-space risk
and provide strong discriminative capability [143]. The authors
refer to this combination as the W-SVM. For our discussion,
however, the theorems of Scheirer et al. [143] are more
interesting than the W-SVM itself. They prove that sum,
product, min, and max fusions of compact abating probability
(CAP) models again generate CAP models. Bendale and
Boult [145] extended this work to show that CAP models in
linearly transformed spaces manage open space risk in the
original input space. While these works are interesting, the
formulations limit their application to probability distributions.
Due to the need for efficient model updates in an intrusion
recognition setting, enforcing probabilistic constraints on the
recognition problem might be non-trivial, due to the need to
re-normalize at each increment. We therefore generalize the
theorems of Scheirer et al. [143] as follows.
Theorem 1. Abating Bounds for Open Space Risk: As-
sume a set of non-negative continuous bounded functions
{g1, . . . , gn} where gk(x, x′) decreases monotonically with
||x − x′||. Then thresholding any positively weighted sum,
product, min, or max fusion of a finite set of non-negative
discrete or continuous functions {f1, . . . , fn} that satisfy
fk(x, x
′) ≤ gk(x, x′) ∀k manages open space risk, i.e., it
allows us to constrain open space risk below any given .
Proof. Given τ > 0, define
g′k(x, x
′, τ) :=
{
gk(x, x
′) if gk(x, x′) > τ
0 otherwise.
f ′k(x, x
′, τ) :=
{
fk(x, x
′) if fk(x, x′) > τ
0 otherwise.
This yields f ′k(x, x
′) ≤ g′k(x, x′) ∀k. Because of
the monotonicity of gk, for any fixed constant δ,
∃τδ :
∫
g′k(x, x
′, τ) dx ≤ δ. Combining that with f ′k(x, x′) ≤
g′k(x, x
′), yields
∫
f ′k(x, x
′, τδ) dx ≤ δ, thus limiting pos-
itively labeled area to fk(x, x′) > τ , which manages open
space risk. Without loss of generality on k, it is easy to see
that max and min fusion also manage open space risk. Because
summation is a linear operator:∫ ∑
k
f ′k(x, x
′, τ) dx =
∑
k
∫
f ′k(x, x
′, τ) dx.
Since a finite sum of finite values is finite, and∑
k
∫
f ′k(x, x
′, τ) dx ≤ kδ it follows that thresholded pos-
itively weighted sums of f ′k manage open space risk. In
addition,
∏
k f
′
k is bounded because
gk ⇒ ∃η : g′k(x, x′, τ) < η ⇒
∫ ∏
k
g′k(x, x
′, τ)dx ≤ ηkδ.
This latter bound may not be tight, but is sufficient to show
that
∏
k g
′
k(x, x
′, τ) manages open space risk. We have proven
Theorem 1 without weights in the sums and products, but
without loss of generality, non-negative weights can be incor-
porated directly into gk.
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From Theorem 1, it directly follows that many novelty
detection algorithms already in use by the IDS community
provably manage open space risk and fit nicely into the open
set recognition framework. For example, Scheirer et al. [143]
prove that thresholding neighbor methods by distance manages
open space risk. Via such thresholding, clustering methods can
be extended to an online regime, in which unknown classes
U1, . . . , UΩ are isolated [142]. Similarly, thresholded kernel
density estimation (KDE) of “normal” data distributions has
been successfully applied to the IDS domain. Yeung and Chow
[146] used kernel density estimates, in which they centered an
isotropic Gaussian kernel on every data point xk. It is easy to
prove that such estimates also manage open space risk.
Corollary 1. Gaussian KDE Bounds for Open Space Risk.
Assume a Gaussian kernel density estimator where:
p(x) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1
(2piσ2)D/2
exp
( ||x− xk||2
2σ2
)
.
Thresholding p(x) by 0 < τ ≤ 1 manages open space risk.
Proof. When N is the total number of points, each kernel is
given by:
fk(x, xk) =
1
N
1
(2piσ2)D/2
exp
( ||x− xk||2
2σ2
)
.
By Theorem 1, we can treat fk(x, xk) as its own bound. When
thresholded, fk(x, xk) will finitely bound open space risk. The
kernel density estimate:
p(x) =
N∑
k=1
fk(x, xk) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1
(2piσ2)D/2
exp
( ||x− xk||2
2σ2
)
also bounds open space risk because it is a positively weighted
sum of functions that satisfy the bounding criteria in Theo-
rem 1.
Thresholded nearest neighbor approaches and KDE require
selection of a meaningful σ, and distance/probability thresh-
old. They also implicitly assume local isotropy in the feature
space, which highlights the need for a meaningful feature
space representation.
Neighbor and kernel density estimators are nonparametric
models, but several parametric novelty detectors in use by
the IDS community also provably manage open space risk.
Thresholding density estimates from Gaussian mixture models
(GMMs) is a popular parametric approach to novelty detection
with a similar functional form to KDE [147]–[151]. For
GMMs, however, the input data x is assumed distributed as a
superposition of a fixed number of Gaussians:
p(x) =
∑
k
ckN(x|µk,Σk)
such that
∑
k ck = 1. Unlike nonparametric Gaussian KDE, in
which µ and σ are selected apriori, the Gaussians in a GMM
are fit via an expectation maximization technique similar to
that used by HMMs. By generalizing Corollary 1, we can
prove that thresholding GMMs probabilities manages open
space risk. When GMMs integrate to one, they are also CAP
models. Although this constraint often holds, it is not required.
Corollary 2. GMM Bounds for Open Space Risk. Assume
a Gaussian mixture model. The thresholded density estimate
from this model bounds open space risk.
Proof. By Theorem 1, the kth mode of a GMM:
fk(x, µ) = cke
− 12 (x−µ)T (x−µ)
is its own abating bound. Because the superposition of all
modes is a sum of non-negatively weighted functions, each
with an abating bound, GMMs have an abating bound. Thresh-
olding GMM density estimates therefore manages open space
risk.
Note that Corollary 2 only holds for the density estimate
from an individual GMM, and not necessarily for all recogni-
tion functions that leverage multiple GMMs. For example, the
log ratio of probabilities of two GMM estimates, log p1(x)p2(x)
does not bound open space risk when p1(x)p2(x) diverges as
either p1(x) or p2(x) → 0. Similarly a recognition function
p1(x) > p2(x) does not provably manage open space risk
because p1(x) > p2(x) can hold over unbounded x.
There is a strong connection between GMMs and the
aforementioned HMMs. Similarly to HMMs, GMMs can also
be viewed as discrete latent variable models. Given input
data x and multinomial random variable z, whose value
corresponds to the generating Gaussian, the joint distribution
factors according to the product rule: p(x, z) = p(z)p(x|z).
p(z) is determined by the Gaussian mixture coefficients ck.
Therefore, the factorization of GMMs can be viewed as a
simplification of HMMs, with a factor graph, in which latent
variables are not connected and, therefore, treated independent
of sequence.
This raises two questions: first, can HMMs can be used
for novelty detection? And second, do HMMs manage open
space risk? Indeed, HMMs can be used for novelty detection
on sequential data by running inference on sequences in the
training set and thresholding the estimated joint probability (or
log of the estimated joint probability) outputs. This approach
was taken by Yeung et al. [152] for host-based intrusion
detection using system call sequences. To assess, whether
HMMs manage open space risk, we need to consider the form
of an HMM’s estimated joint distribution. For an N -length
sequence, an HMM factors as:
p(x1, .., xN , z1, .., zN ) = p(z1)
N∏
n=2
p(zn|zn−1)
N∏
n=1
p(xn|zn)
where x1, . . . , xN are observations and z1, . . . , zN are latent
variables. This leads to Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. HMM Bounds for Open Space Risk. Assume
HMM factors p(z1), p(zn|zn−1), and p(xn|zn) satisfy the
bounding constraints in Theorem 1. Then thresholding the
output of a forward pass of an HMM bounds open space risk.
Proof. Under the assumption that p(z1), p(zn|zn−1), and
p(xn|zn) satisfy the bounding constraints in Theorem 1, then
the HMM factorization above is a product of these functions,
which by Theorem 1 manages open space risk.
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Corollary 3 states that under certain assumptions on the
form of the factors in HMMs, an HMM will provably manage
open space risk. Unfortunately, it is not immediately clear
how to enforce such a form, so many HMMs, including
those in [152] are not proven to manage open space risk and
may ascribe known labels to infinite open space. Formulating
HMMs that manage open space risk and provide adequate
modeling of data is an important topic, which we leave for
future research.
GMMs and HMMs are linear models. One-class SVMs
are popular nonlinear models, which have been successfully
applied to detecting novel intrusions [153]–[158]. In their The-
orem 2, Scheirer et al. [143] prove that one-class SVM density
estimators [159] with a Gaussian radial-basis function (RBF)
kernel manage open space risk. The decision functions for
these machines are given by
∑
k αkK(x, xk), where K(x, xk)
is the kernel function and αi are the Lagrange multipliers. It is
important to note that non-negative αk are required to satisfy
Theorem 1 in [143], and that multi-class RBF SVMs and one-
class SVMs under different objective functions are not proven
to manage open space risk.
C. Open World Archetypes for Stealth Malware Intrusion
Recognition
The open set recognition framework introduced in Sec. V-B
can be incorporated into existing intrusion recognition algo-
rithms. This means that there is no need to abandon closed set
algorithms in order to manage open space risk, provided that
they are fused with open set recognition algorithms. Closed
set techniques may be excellent solutions when they are well
supported by training data, but open set algorithms are required
in order to ascertain whether the closed set decisions are
meaningful. Therefore, the open set problem can be addressed
by using an algorithm that is inherently open set for novelty
detection and rejecting any closed set decision as unknown
if its support is below the open set threshold. A model with
easily interpreted diagnostic information, e.g., a decision tree
or Bayesian network, can be fused with the open set algorithm
as well, in order to decrease response/mitigation times and to
compensate for other discriminative algorithms that are not
so readily interpretable. Note that many of the algorithms
proposed by Scheirer et al. are discriminative classifiers them-
selves, but underperform the state of the art in a purely closed
setting.
The interpretation of a thresholded open set decision is
trivial, assuming that the recognition function represents some
sort of density estimation. For a query point, if the maximum
density with respect to each class is below the open set thresh-
old, τ , then the class is labeled as “unknown”. Otherwise, the
query sample is ascribed the label corresponding to the class of
maximum density. Under the open set formulation, the degree
of openness can be controlled by the value of τ . The desired
amount of openness will vary depending on the algorithm
and the application’s optimal precision/recall requirements.
For example, a high security non-latency sensitive virtualized
environment that is administered by many security experts
can label many examples as unknown and interpose state
frequently for an expert opinion. Systems that are latency
sensitive, but for which potential harm of intrusion is relatively
low, might have much looser open space bounds.
Note that an open set density estimator can be applied
with or without normalization to a probability distribution.
However, we can only prove that it manages open space risk
if the estimator’s decision function satisfies Theorem 1.
Open set algorithms can also be applied under many dif-
ferent feature space transformations. When open set algo-
rithms are fused with closed set algorithms, the two need
not necessarily operate in the same feature space. Research
has demonstrated [145], [160] the effectiveness of the open
set classification framework in machine-learnt feature spaces.
Bendale and Boult [145] bounded a nearest class mean (NCM)
classifier in a metric-learnt transformed space, an algorithm
they dubbed nearest non-outlier (NNO). They also proved that
under a linear transformation, open space risk management
in the transformed feature space will manage open space
risk in the original input space. Rudd et al. [160] formulated
extreme value machine (EVM) classifiers to perform open set
classification in a feature space learnt from a convolutional
neural network. The EVM formulation performs a kernel-like
transformation, which supports variable data bandwidths, that
implicitly transforms any feature space to a probabilistically
meaningful representation. This research indicates that open
set algorithms can support meaningful feature space trans-
formations, although what constitutes a “good” feature space
depends on the problem and classifier in question.
Bendale and Boult [145] and Rudd et al. [160] also extended
open set recognition algorithms to an online regime, which
supports incremental model updates. They dubbed this recog-
nition scenario open world recognition, referring to online
open set recognition. The incremental aspects of this work
are in a similar vein to other online intrusion recognition
techniques [161]–[167], which, given a batch of training points
Xt at time t, aim to update the prior for time t+1 in terms of
the posterior for time t, so that Pt+1(θt+1) ← Pt(θt|Xt, Tt),
where T is the target variable, P is a recognition function,
and θ is a parameter vector. If P is a probability, a Bayesian
treatment can be adopted, where:
Pt+1(θt+1|Xt+1, Tt+1) = Pt+1(Tt+1|θt+1, Xt+1)Pt(θt|Xt, Tt)
Pt+1(Tt+1)
With a few exceptions, however, recognition functions in the
incremental learning intrusion recognition literature generally
do not satisfy Theorem 1, and are not proven to manage open
space risk. This means that they are not necessarily true open
world classifiers.
Moreover, none of the work in [161]–[167] addresses the
pressing need to prioritize labeling of detected novel data for
incremental training. This is problematic, because the objective
of online learning is to adapt a model to recognize new
attack variations and benign patterns – insights that would
otherwise be perishable within a useful time horizon. When
intrusion recognition subsystems exhibit high recall rates,
however, updating the model with new attack signatures is
much more vital than updating the model with novel benign
profiles. Since labeling capacity is often limited by the number
of knowledgeable security practitioners, we contend that the
“optimal” labeling approach is to greedily rank the unknown
PRE-PRINT OF MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATION SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 23
samples in terms of their likelihood of being associated with
known malicious classes. Given bounded radially abating
functions from Theorem 1, i.e., open set decision functions,
we can do just that, prioritizing labeling by some malicious
likelihood criterion (MLC).
The intuition behind the MLC ranking is as follows: from
the discussion in Sec. IV, malwares often share components:
even for vastly different malwares, similar components yield
similar patterns in feature space. Although minor code overlap
will not necessarily cause (mis)categorizations of malware
classes, it may cause novel malware classes to be close
enough to known ones in feature space that they are ranked
higher by MLC criterion than most novel benign samples.
Label prioritization by MLC ranking could, therefore, improve
resource allocation of security professionals and dramatically
reduce the amount of time that stealth malwares are able to
propagate unnoticed. Of course, other considerations besides
MLC are relevant to a truly “optimal” ranking, including
difficulty of diagnosis and likely degree of harm, but these
properties are difficult to ascertain autonomously.
A final useful aspect of the open world intrusion recognition
framework is that it is not confined to naive Gaussian as-
sumptions. Mixtures of Gaussians can work well for modeling
densities, but tend to deteriorate at the distribution tails,
because the tails of the models tend toward tails from unimodal
Gaussians, whereas the tails of the data distributions generally
do not. For recognition problems, however, accurate modeling
of tail behavior is important, in fact, more important than
accurate modeling of class centers [168], [169]. To this end,
researchers have turned to statistical extreme value theory
techniques for density estimation, and open world recognition
readily accommodates them. Both [144] and [143] apply EVT
modeling to open set recognition scenarios based posterior fit-
ting of point distances to classifier decision boundaries, while
[160] incorporated EVT calibration into a generative model,
which performs loose density estimation as a mixture of EVT
distributions. Importantly, the EVT distributions employed by
Rudd et al. [160], unlike Gaussian kernels in an SVM or KDE
application, are variable bandwidth functions of the data. They
are also are directly derived from EVT and incorporate higher-
order statistics which Gaussian distributions cannot (e.g., skew,
curtosis). Finally, they provably manage open space risk.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
Stealth malwares are a growing threat because they ex-
ploit many system features that have legitimate uses and
they can propagate undetected for long periods of time. We,
therefore, felt the need to provide the first academic survey
specifically focused on malicious stealth technologies and
mitigation measures. We hope that security professionals in
both academic and industrial environments can draw on this
work in their research and development efforts. Our work
also highlights the need to combine countermeasures that
aim to protect the integrity of system components with more
generic machine learning solutions. We have identified flawed
assumptions behind many machine learning algorithms and
proposed steps to improve them based on research from other
recognition domains. We encourage the security community to
consider these suggestions in future development of intrusion
recognition algorithms.
While we are the first to propose a mathematically formal-
ized open world approach to intrusion recognition, there are
open issues that must be addressed through experimentation
and implementation, including how tightly to bound open
space risk, and more generally how to determine the openness
of the problem in operational scenarios. An overly aggressive
bound may actually degrade performance for problems that
are predominantly closed-set, prioritizing the minimization
of open space risk over the minimization of empirical risk.
Another important consideration is the cost of misclassifying
an unknown sample as belonging to a known class, which
depends in part on the operational resources available to label
novel classes, and in part on the degree of threat expected
of novel classes. These tradeoffs are important subjects for
experimental analysis and operational deployment of open
world anti-malware systems.
For benchmarking and experimentation, good datasets that
support open world protocols are vital for future research.
While some effort has been made, e.g., [170]–[172], there are
few modern publicly available datasets for intrusion detection,
specifically of stealth malwares. We believe that the collection
and distribution of modernized and realistic publicly available
datasets containing stealth malware samples are vital to the
furtherance of academic research in the field. While many
corporate security companies have good reasons for keeping
their datasets private, a guarded increase in collusion with
academia to allow extended – yet still restricted – sharing of
data is in the best interest of all parties in developing better
stealth malware countermeasures.
We have proven that a number of existing algorithms cur-
rently used in the intrusion recognition domain already satisfy
the requirements of an open set framework, and we believe
that they should be leveraged and extended both in theory and
in practice to address the flawed assumptions behind many
existing algorithms that we detailed in Sec. V-A. Adopting an
open world mathematical framework obviates the assumptions
that intrusions are closed set, anomalies imply class labels, and
that static models are sufficient. How to appropriately address
the other assumptions requires further research. Although
some progress has been made in open world algorithms, the
question, how to obtain a nicely discriminable feature space
while accommodating a readily interpretable model, merits
future research. Finally, how to model class distributions
without Gaussian assumptions demands further mathematical
treatment – statistical extreme value theory is a good start, but
it has yet to be gracefully defined how select distributional
tail boundaries. Also, with the exception of special cases it is
still not well formalized, how to model the remainder of the
distribution (the non-extreme values) of non-Gaussian data.
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APPENDIX: API CALLS, DATA STRUCTURES, AND REGISTRY KEYS
Windows API entry Documentation
CallNextHookEx Passes the hook information to the next hook procedure in the current hook chain. A hook procedure can call
this function either before or after processing the hook information.
CreateRemoteThread Creates a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process.
DeviceIoControl Sends a control code directly to a specified device driver, causing the corresponding device to perform the
corresponding operation.
DllMain An optional entry point into a dynamic-link library (DLL). When the system starts or terminates a process or
thread, it calls the entry-point function for each loaded DLL using the first thread of the process. The system
also calls the entry-point function for a DLL when it is loaded or unloaded using the LoadLibrary and
FreeLibrary functions.
FindFirstFile Searches a directory for a file or subdirectory with a name that matches a specific name (or partial name if
wildcards are used).
FindNextFile Continues a file search from a previous call to the FindFirstFile, FindFirstFileEx, or
FindFirstFileTransacted functions.
GetProcAddress Retrieves the address of an exported function or variable from the specified dynamic-link library (DLL).
LoadLibrary Loads the specified module into the address space of the calling process. The specified module may cause other
modules to be loaded.
NtDelayExecution Undocumented export of ntdll.dll.
NTQuerySystemInformation Retrieves the specified system information.
OpenProcess Opens an existing local process object.
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine The PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine routine registers a driver-supplied callback that is subsequently
notified whenever an image is loaded (or mapped into memory).
PspCreateProcessNotify Completely undocumented function.
SetWindowsHookEx Installs an application-defined hook procedure into a hook chain. You would install a hook procedure to monitor
the system for certain types of events. These events are associated either with a specific thread or with all threads
in the same desktop as the calling thread.
SleepEx Suspends the current thread until the specified condition is met.
WriteProcessMemory Writes data to an area of memory in a specified process. The entire area to be written to must be accessible or
the operation fails.
ZwQuerySystemInformation Retrieves the specified system information.
EAT The Export Address Table is a table where functions exported by a module are placed so that they can
be used by other modules.
EPROCESS The EPROCESS structure is an opaque executive-layer structure that serves as the process object for a process.
IAT The Import Address Table is where the dynamic linker writes addresses of loaded modules such that each
entry points to the memory locations of library functions.
IDT The Interrupt Descriptor Table is a kernel-level table of function pointers to callbacks that are called
upon interrupts / exceptions.
IRP I/O Request Packets are used to communicate between device drivers and other areas of the kernel.
KTHREAD The KTHREAD structure is an opaque kernel-layer structure that serves as the thread object for a thread.
KeServiceDescriptorTable Contains pointers to the SSDT and SSPT. It is an undocumented export of ntoskrnl.exe.
SSDT The System Service Descriptor Table is a kernel-level dispatch table of callbacks for system calls.
SSPT The System Service Parameter Table is a kernel-level table containing sizes (in bytes) of arguments
for SSDT callbacks.
AppInit_DLLs Space or comma delimited list of DLLs to load.
LoadAppInit_DLLs Globally enables or disables AppInit_DLLs.
kernel32.dll Exposes to applications most of the Win32 base APIs, such as memory management, input/output (I/O) operations,
process and thread creation, and synchronization functions.
ntdll.dll Exports the Windows Native API. The Native API is the interface used by user-mode components of the operating
system that must run without support from Win32 or other API subsystems.
ntoskrnl.exe Provides the kernel and executive layers of the Windows NT kernel space, and is responsible for various system
services such as hardware virtualization, process and memory management, thus making it a fundamental part of
the system.
user32.dll Implements the Windows user component that creates and manipulates the standard elements of the Windows
user interface, such as the desktop, windows, and menus.
TABLE I: SYSTEM CALLS. This table explains the Windows system calls, data structures, registry keys and system files (in this order)
that are used in the malware described in this section, in alphabetical order. Many of the entries are copied directly from the Microsoft
Developer Network (MSDN) documentation [173] or Wikipedia for file descriptions [174]. Others are summaries of descriptions from
later in the text with their own respective citations.
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